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Abstract
Components of networks, and by extension the internet can fail. It is, therefore, important to find the points
of failure and resolve existing issues as quickly as possible. Resolution, however, takes time and its important
to maintain high quality of service (QoS) for existing clients while it is in progress. In this work, our goal is to
provide clients with means of avoiding failures if/when possible to maintain high QoS while enabling them to
assist in the diagnosis process to speed up the time to recovery.
Fixing failures relies on first detecting that there is one and then identifying where it occurred so as to be able
to remedy it. We take a two-step approach in our solution. First, we identify the entity (Client, Server,
Network) responsible for the failure. Next, if a failure is identified as network related additional algorithms are
triggered to detect the device responsible.
To achieve the first step, we revisit the question: how much can you infer about a failure using TCP statistics
collected at one of the endpoints in a connection? Using an agent that captures TCP statistics at one of the
end points we devise a classification algorithm that identifies the root cause of failures. Using insights derived
from this classification algorithm we identify dominant TCP metrics that indicate where/why problems
occur. If/when a failure is identified as a network related problem, the second step is triggered, where the
algorithm uses additional information that is collected from ``failed'' connections to identify the device which
resulted in the failure.
Failures are also disruptive to user's performance. Resolution may take time. Therefore, it is important to be
able to shield clients from their effects as much as possible.
One option for avoiding problems resulting from failures is to rely on multiple paths (they are unlikely to go
bad at the same time). The use of multiple paths involves both selecting paths (routing) and using them
effectively. The second part of this thesis explores the efficacy of multipath communication in such situations.
It is expected that multi-path communications have monetary implications for the ISP's and content
providers. Our solution, therefore, aims to minimize such costs to the content providers while significantly
improving user performance.
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ABSTRACT
IMPROVING NETWORK PERFORMANCE THROUGH ENDPOINT
DIAGNOSIS AND MULTIPATH COMMUNICATIONS
Behnaz Arzani
Boon Thau Loo
Roch Guerin
Components of networks, and by extension the internet can fail. It is, therefore,
important to find the points of failure and resolve existing issues as quickly as pos-
sible. Resolution, however, takes time and its important to maintain high quality
of service (QoS) for existing clients while it is in progress. In this work, our goal
is to provide clients with means of avoiding failures if/when possible to maintain
high QoS while enabling them to assist in the diagnosis process to speed up the
time to recovery.
Fixing failures relies on first detecting that there is one and then identifying
where it occurred so as to be able to remedy it. We take a two-step approach in our
solution. First, we identify the entity (Client, Server, Network) responsible for the
failure. Next, if a failure is identified as network related additional algorithms are
triggered to detect the device responsible.
To achieve the first step, we revisit the question: how much can you infer about
a failure using TCP statistics collected at one of the endpoints in a connection?
Using an agent that captures TCP statistics at one of the end points we devise a
classification algorithm that identifies the root cause of failures. Using insights
derived from this classification algorithm we identify dominant TCP metrics that
indicate where/why problems occur. If/when a failure is identified as a network
related problem, the second step is triggered, where the algorithm uses additional
information that is collected from “failed” connections to identify the device which
resulted in the failure.
vi
Failures are also disruptive to user’s performance. Resolution may take time.
Therefore, it is important to be able to shield clients from their effects as much as
possible. One option for avoiding problems resulting from failures is to rely on
multiple paths (they are unlikely to go bad at the same time). The use of multiple
paths involves both selecting paths (routing) and using them effectively. The sec-
ond part of this thesis explores the efficacy of multipath communication in such
situations. It is expected that multi-path communications have monetary impli-
cations for the ISP’s and content providers. Our solution, therefore, aims to min-
imize such costs to the content providers while significantly improving user per-
formance.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Today guaranteeing good performance to users of the Internet as well as various
other networks such as datacenters is still a challenge [8, 42, 119, 65]. These net-
works are comprised of hundreds (if not tens of thousands) of routers and switches
which deliver user traffic on a best effort basis.
Failures and performance problems in such settings are not uncommon. Sources
of problems include (but are not limited to) congestion in the network, server over-
loads, link failures, and occasionally bad configurations. ISP’s attempt to deal with
problems such as congestion through traffic engineering [54, 15]. Datacenter oper-
ators have devised various diagnosis and debugging tools to minimize the mean
time to recovery [119, 65, 145, 17, 5]. However, none of these solutions are com-
pletely effective (especially in providing real-time solutions). The traffic engineer-
ing problem for traditional network protocols is NP hard [54]. Furthermore, in
both datacenters and the Internet, the network is typically comprised of a number
of different corporations and organizations. These organizations do not always
have an incentive to cooperate and to share information across their respective
boundaries. As a simple example, while BGP allows for ASs to advertise their
path preferences to their neighbors (through MED values), most ASs ignore such
1
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specifications when deciding on the best path for their traffic. This makes global
traffic engineering difficult, if not impossible. In datacenters, the users belonging
to one organization may access a different organizations service through the dat-
acenter’s network, rendering end to end monitoring and visibility difficult. On
some occasions, these entities also provide competitive services to the users which
limit their willingness to cooperate [101]. Therefore, tools and methodologies that
depend on such information sharing typically are inadequate.
It is for these reasons that we believe it is important to empower the end users
themselves to be able to circumvent congestion occurrences and failures when they
occur, as well as to assist in the diagnosis process in the event of failures as they are
able to indirectly observe the entire communication path. Doing so requires solv-
ing a number of different challenges. To enable users (clients) to assist in the di-
agnosis process, effective monitoring tools are required that enable them to reason
about the network and the service without direct visibility into these systems. Fur-
thermore, such monitoring tools would need to be extremely lightweight as they
should coexist with the client without disrupting its “normal” behavior. Mean-
while, there are a number of different approaches that can be used to enable clients
to maintain high quality of service (QoS) when failures occur. One example is the
use of diversity coding [16] which augment the data transmitted from the end host
with additional redundancy to enable recovery from potential losses. However,
the ability of such approaches to cope with high loss rates is limited. A differ-
ent approach would be to allow clients to make use of the path diversity inher-
ently present in today’s networks (both datacenters and the Internet) as such path
are unlikely to fail at the exact same time. By doing so clients can route around
such failures if and when they occur. Doing so requires clients to detect/quantify
path quality and to quickly and effectively migrate traffic onto healthy path when
failures occur. Furthermore, there are cost implications to the ISPs and content
providers that need to be accounted for. For example, in this work, we will show
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that multipath clients tend to result in an increase in cost for content providers.
However, with careful planning, such impacts can be largely controlled and miti-
gated.
Our contributions in this work are to address the afore mentioned challenges.
Specifically:
• Endpoint Diagnosis. We attempt to allow clients to assist in the diagnosis
process. We take a two-step approach to solving this problem: a) we iden-
tify the entity responsible for the failure through a system we call NetPoirot.
NetPoirot answers the following question: how much can you infer about
a failure in the data center using TCP statistics collected at one of the end-
points? Using an agent that captures TCP statistics it creates a classification
algorithm that identifies the root cause of failures using this information at a
single endpoint. Our evaluations on a real production datacenter show that
it is highly accurate in identifying the entity responsible for the failure. b) In
many cases, the entity identified by NetPoirot as the cause of the failure is
the network. The network itself, however, is comprised of many devices and
machines. Through a system named Vigil, we identify which of these de-
vices was responsible for each failure instance. Vigil is a lightweight always
on monitoring tool that is completely contained within the end hosts. During
its one-month deployment in a tier-1 data center, it has detected every prob-
lem identified by other previously deployed monitoring services while also
finding the sources of other problems. The system is effective in detecting
drop rates as low as 0.05%.
• Endpoint resilience through multipath communications. We explore the
efficacy of the Multipath TCP transport protocol in allowing clients to cir-
cumvent failures by going through multiple paths. Such solutions have been
extensively studied in the context of datacenters and ISPs e.g., [9, 105]. How-
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ever, their implications in many contexts, especially when used for applica-
tions such as video delivery, is not yet completely understood. We show in
this work that the current state of the art multipath transport protocol [105]
suffers from unintended consequences that could have severe implications
those using it. We further illustrate why such multipath approaches typi-
cally result in an increase in peering cost when used for applications such as
video delivery. We then present a new solution in this context which attempts
to remove all such undesirable behaviors and that effectively improves user
performance.
The main contribution of this work is, therefore, in extending current approaches
for both diagnosis and resilience in a way that they can be used at the endpoints,
without any support from the network operators, and without negatively affecting
the other parties involved in the communication process.
4
Chapter 2
Finding The Entity Responsible For
The Failure
2.1 Introduction
Components of networks, and by extension the internet can fail. We can deal with
these failures in two ways. We can either try finding the points of failure and
fixing them, or we try avoiding the failures and route around them. The first two
chapters of this thesis are devoted to the first of these two solutions.
Fixing failures relies on first detecting that there is one and then identifying
where it occurred so as to be able to remedy it. We take a two step approach in
our solution. First, we identify the entity (Client, Server, Network) responsible
for the failure. Next, if a failure is identified as network related additional algo-
rithms are triggered to detect the device responsible. This approach allows for
a targeted investigation whereby additional monitoring/diagnosis algorithms are
only initiated when necessary, thus significantly reducing the diagnosis overhead.
Furthermore, such a design significantly reduces the amount of cooperation re-
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quired between the entities maintaining the client, server, and the network in the
diagnosis process.
The first step is done through a system we refer to as NetPoirot. NetPoirot
relies on TCP metrics captured from one of the endpoints involved in a TCP con-
nection to determine which entity is responsible for the failure. Our evaluations of
NetPoirot in a production data center shows that it is highly accurate (with Recall
and Percision as high as 97%). Our results also indicate that 17% of the failures
observed and diagnosed by NetPoirot were network related. This introduces the
need for additional steps in identifying the device (in the network) that is responsi-
ble for such failures. We do this through a system we refer to as Vigil. This chapter
is devoted to the description of NetPoirot. We defer the description of Vigil to the
next chapter.
2.2 Motivation
In today’s data centers, a common issue faced by operators is troubleshooting
faults in complex services. It is often unclear whether the cause of performance
bottlenecks lies in the underlying network, client, or service-level application code/-
machine. Often times, the knee-jerk reaction is to first blame the network whenever
performance issues surface.
The problem is exacerbated by two issues. First, the parties involved in di-
agnosing the errors (e.g. the service DevOps engineers, network operators) may
operate as different entities either within or across companies and each party may
lack easy access to the other’s performance/debugging logs. This significantly
increases debugging time and extends the mean time to recovery. Second, these
failures are sometimes intermittent and non-deterministic, and hence difficult to
reproduce without high fidelity, always on, monitoring probes in place through-
out the entire infrastructure.
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To highlight these challenges, we present a real-world example seen within a
production cloud. The public cloud offering is used by over 1 billion customers,
whose applications reside within VMs in its data centers. In one particular sce-
nario, the VM triggers an operation within the hypervisor, that requires the hy-
pervisor to send a request to a remote service. Whenever the request/response
latency increases (due to remote service failure, overload, or network slowdowns),
an error occurs in the hypervisor which in turn causes the VM to panic and reboot,
hence disrupting normal operations. We refer to this as “Event X or EX”.
EX occurs intermittently and only on a subset of nodes at any given time. How-
ever, its occurrence is sufficiently frequent to degrade user experience. It is also
unclear when a reboot happens, whether the error is caused by a remote service
issue (overload, server failure), or a network problem (e.g. packet drops or router
misconfigurations). In one example, when EX occurred the remote service De-
vOps team was first contacted. They suspected that EX may be occurring due to
high request/response latencies, and blamed the network, and passed on the di-
agnostics to the network engineers. The network engineers observed normal RTT
times in TCP traces at the time of failure and suspected that the problem is prob-
ably due to slow server responses, and handed over the issue back to the server
operations team. The iterations continued until the various teams involved pieced
together the sequence of events that led to the service disruption. The entire pro-
cess is time-consuming, expensive, and involves many engineers and developers
spanning different organizations. To make matters worse, while the symptoms of
EX may be the same, the actual cause may differ across occurrence, and fixing one
occurrence of EX may not prevent others from happening in the future. Note that
such lengthy debugging across multiple subsystems is an issue not unique to this
production cloud, and has been reported elsewhere as well [132, 65].
While many network diagnosis tools have been developed in the past, all of
them come short in some way when solving problems such as EX. Some require
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access to the entire system [138], others are too heavyweight and so cannot be used
in an always on fashion [140, 143], and finally some require information that the
service/network are not willing to share [17, 138]. Many of the proposed concepts
in these tools have been adopted by the afore mentioned organization and their
failure in assisting its engineers to diagnose EX is itself a testament to the persistent
need for a more effective tool.
In the ideal case, one would like to quickly pinpoint the most likely source of the
failure within the infrastructure. The team (client, network, or remote service) that
owns the failure can then provide a timely response, rather than have the error be
passed around within organizations.
To achieve this goal, we propose NetPoirot 1 that aims to perform such failure
attribution quickly and accurately. NetPoirot requires only a TCP measurement
agent to be deployed at each client VM in the cloud. The key insight of NetPoirot
is that different types of failures, albeit not network related, will cause TCP to react
differently. For example, a slow reading remote service results in exhaustion of the
TCP receive window on the sender VM, which itself triggers TCP zero window
probing. Packet drops on a router result in an increase in the number of duplicate
ACKs. High CPU load on the client result in fewer transmission opportunities for
the client application and thus fewer data sent by TCP. These differences are not
always easy to define, given the high correlation between the various TCP metrics.
Specifically, NetPoirot makes the following contributions:
Lightweight continuous monitoring. We develop a TCP monitoring agent that
runs on all client machines within our data centers. These machines request ser-
vices within and across data centers under our administration. The agent captures
various TCP related metrics periodically. It is implemented in Windows, although
a similar tool in Linux can be supported. Unlike more heavyweight approaches
1Named after Agatha Christie’s famous detective Hercule Poirot.
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that require packet captures, NetPoirot ’s agent is lightweight and non-intrusive,
requiring only aggregate TCP statistics to be periodically collected and measured.
At runtime, the agent requires only 132 numeric values be examined (and then
discarded) by the client machine every 30 seconds.
Machine-learning based classification. Using data collected from our agents, we
study the extent in which TCP statistics can be used to distinguish various types of
failures in data centers using decision-tree based supervised learning algorithms.
We then identify the key parameters in TCP that are most representative of each
type of failure in data centers.
Our approach is a significant improvement over techniques such as SNAP [138].
SNAP requires full knowledge of the data center topology, machine configuration,
and application to server mapping. Furthermore, it manually reasons about each
type of failure and devises a rule for each problem accordingly. Such manual in-
spections are limited in scope and are prone to human error. NetPoirot uses ma-
chine learning instead, which allows us to uncover more complex insights. For
example, our use of decision trees allows us to identify the dominant set of TCP
metrics that help to classify each failure. Furthermore, NetPoirot does not require
any knowledge of the topology, or client to server mappings.
NetPoirot implementation. We have designed and developed a proof-of-concept
implementation of NetPoirot that combines the above two ideas and is used for
diagnosis at runtime. NetPoirot consists of a training phase, where a variety of
faults are injected onto training VMs, in order to produce a diagnosis function as
output. This function is then distributed to all machines in the data center to be
used at runtime to identify the source of failures. NetPoirot can be used by both
customers and data center operators as it does not require any information from the
network or service.
NetPoirot evaluation. We perform an extensive evaluation of NetPoirot to validate
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its effectiveness. We evaluate the worst case performance of NetPoirot using data
collected over a 6 month period in a production data center that hosts over 170K
web servers and transfers 10Tbps of traffic. We have induced 12 different common
types of failures in the communication of two different applications running on 30
different machines and observed the changes in TCP statistics collected from these
machines. NetPoirot performs coarse-grained blame allocation on this data with
high accuracy (96% for some failure types). NetPoirot ’s accuracy improves even
further if its input information is augmented with additional information from the
endpoint on which it resides. Our monitoring agent has currently been deployed
on all the compute nodes within our data centers. We show that NetPoirot can
accurately identify the entity responsible for a variety of failures.
The tradeoff that NetPoirot makes is that while it is able to determine the en-
tity (network, client, remote service) most responsible for the failure, it does not
pinpoint the exact physical device or the specific problem type (e.g. high CPU
load on the server vs high I/O load on the server). We argue that this is a worth-
while tradeoff because identifying the entity is often times the operationally most
time-consuming (and hence expensive) part of failure detection, e.g. EX failures
take from 1 hour (high severity) to days to diagnose. In fact, the development of
NetPoirot was commissioned as a direct result of this problem in the case of EX.
While we do not claim that we can diagnose all potential problems, our results
indicate that it is possible to distinguish between a number of common network,
server, and client failures with high accuracy. This is significant, as we do not need
to use per-flow TCP metrics, nor do we need data from both endpoints. Since
only aggregate metrics are collected, our methodology allows us to maintain some
extent of customer privacy.
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Figure 2.1: Overview of NetPoirot
2.3 Overview
We first begin with an overview of NetPoirot , which consists of two phases: train-
ing and runtime.
Training phase. Fig. 3.2 depicts the training phase. The training phase occurs in
the production environment on a subset of machines, termed as the training nodes.
During this phase, a TCP monitoring agent is installed on these nodes. Details on
the monitoring agent are presented in Section 2.4. The agent can be either installed
at the hypervisor or within individual VMs hosted by the training nodes. When
there are no failures, agent statistics are periodically sent to the learning agent to
capture the behavior of a non-fault scenario. From time to time, we use a fault in-
jector to inject a variety of failures listed in Table 2.1. We define the “client” as the
local machine that is communicating with a remote service, which we refer to as
the “server”. Failures range from increased CPU load, increased memory load, in-
creased storage load (by generating excess I/Os on either the client or server using
11
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General
label
Failure How it is induced
Server
High CPU load
on server
Application running kernel
level CPU intensive opera-
tions
Slow reading
server
Modified the server applica-
tion, added a random delay to
its read operation
High I/O on
server
SQLIO [92]
High memory
load on server
Testlimit [93]
Client
High CPU load
on client
Application running kernel
level CPU intensive opera-
tions
High I/O on
client
SQLIO l [92]
High memory
load on client
Testlimit [93]
Network
Bandwidth
throttling
Added rules in the A10’s
Sporadic packet
drops
SoftPerfect [4]
Packet reorder-
ing
SoftPerfect [4]
Random con-
nection drops
NEWT [94]
High Latency SoftPerfect [4]
Table 2.1: Table describing the types of faults we induced in our system for train-
ing.
SQLIO), and also various forms of network-related problems such as throttling or
packet drops.
For each injected failure, the monitoring agent’s TCP statistics are collected and
then used by the learning agent to create a diagnosis function, trained using as the
label, either the actual failure itself or its type (e.g. client, remote, network). The
diagnosis function is the output of our supervised learning algorithm. The input
to the function is the latest TCP statistics read from the end point, and the output
is the entity most likely to be responsible for the failure. This function is broadcast
to all VMs at the end of the training phase.
Runtime phase. At run time, all monitored nodes run the monitoring agent. When-
ever failures are detected, each VM invokes the diagnosis function using digests
collected locally and then generate as output the likely source of failure.
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2.4 Description of NetPoirot
In this section, we describe the various components of NetPoirot . NetPoirot is
comprised of a monitoring agent that collects data that is then input to a learning
agent. The learning agent uses this information to create a diagnosis function that
is used at runtime. The following describes the details of each of these components
in more detail.
2.4.1 Monitoring Agent
Our TCP monitoring agent is installed at each machine’s hypervisor or within in-
dividual VMs. The installation is limited to only client machines communicating
with various remote services within/across data centers. For example, if the re-
mote service is storage, this precludes the need to run the agent on storage servers.
The agent collects TCP statistics for all connections seen on its monitored node.
Given that our implementation is based on Windows, we will describe the agent
based on Windows terminology. These statistics can also be collected in a Linux-
based system.
The agent is implemented using Windows ETW events [91], a publish-subscribe
messaging system in the Windows OS. A TCP ETW event is triggered every time
a TCP related event, e.g. the arrival of a duplicate ACK occurs on any one of the
connections currently active in the OS. The agent collects and aggregates events at
the granularity of epochs so as to minimize bandwidth/storage overhead during
training. Within every epoch, it receives ETW events, extracts relevant features
and stores them in a hash table based on TCP’s 5−tuple. At the end of an epoch,
the TCP metrics that depend on the transmission rate are normalized by the num-
ber of bytes posted by the application in that epoch. The normalized metrics are
marked in Table 2.2. Each individual metric is then further aggregated by calculat-
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metric statistics
calcu-
lated
abbreviation
Number of flows R NumFlows
Maximum congestion window
in δ
S MCWND
The change in congestion win-
dow in δ
S(∗) DCWND
The last congestion window ob-
served in δ
S(∗) LCWND
The last advertised (re-
mote)receive window observed
in δ
S(∗) LRWND
The change in (remote) receive
window observed in δ
S (*) DRWND
Maximum smooth RTT esti-
mate observed in δ
S (*) MRTT
Sum of the smooth RTT esti-
mates observed in δ
S (*) SumRTT
Number of smooth RTT esti-
mates observed in δ
S (*) NumRTT
Duration in which connection
has been open
S Duration
Fraction of open connections R FracOpen
Fraction of connection closed R FracClosed
Fraction of connections newly
opened
R FracNew
Number of duplicate ACKs S (*) DupAcks
Number of triple duplicate
ACKs
S (*) TDupAcks
Number of timeouts S (*) Timeouts
Number of resets S (*) RSTs
Time spent in zero window
probing
S Probing
Error codes observed by the
socket
R Error Code
Number of bytes posted by the
application
S BPosted
Number of bytes sent by TCP S BSent
Number of bytes received by
TCP
S (*) BReceived
Number of bytes delivered to
the application
S (*) BDelivered
Ratio of the number of bytes
posted by the application to the
number of bytes sent
S BPostedToBSent
Ratio of the number of bytes re-
ceived by TCP to the number of
bytes delivered
S BReceivedToBDelivered
Table 2.2: Features captured by the monitoring agent during each epoch. We useR
to show that the raw value of a feature is captured and S to show that we capture
the statistics of that feature. (*) indicates normalized metrics.
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ing its mean, standard deviation, min, max, 10th, 50th, and 95th percentile across all
TCP connections going to the same destination IP/Port.
We assume that identical failures happen within a single epoch, e.g. if a con-
nection experiences failure A, then all other connections between the same end-
points in the same epoch either experience no failure, or also experience failure
A. Therefore, the epoch duration needs to be carefully tuned. Small epochs in-
crease monitoring overhead, but large epochs run the risk that sporadic failures of
different types will occur within one epoch, affecting the accuracy of the learning
algorithm. We currently use an epoch of 30s. Fine tuning the epoch duration is
part of our future work.
Table 2.2 shows the features maintained within an epoch by the monitoring
agent. Our aggregation method reduces the amount of bandwidth required on the
machines in the training stage2 and has the added benefit of hiding the clients exact
transmission patterns. Furthermore, when applications change their transmission
pattern across connections in reaction to failures it allows for this change to be
detected. In the other extreme, one may decide to use per connection statistics with
more overhead but with the benefit of detecting why each individual connection
has failed separately.
The agent imposes low runtime overheads. Based on our benchmarks, even
in the absence of aggregation, when processing 500, 000 events per second, each
agent uses 4% CPU load on an 8 core machine and less than 20 MB in memory.
2.4.2 Learning Agent
During the training phase, the learning agent takes as input TCP metrics gathered
by monitoring agents on training nodes. At run time, it distributes the learned
2Without aggregation, the client needs to transmit 31n features every epoch to the learning
agent where n is the number of connections during that epoch. With aggregation, this number is
reduced to 130.
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model to all clients to be used for diagnosis. The model has to quickly classify
epochs with the appropriate labels to indicate whether it is a remote (Server), local
(Client), or Network issue.
The learning agent uses decision trees as its classification model. In a decision
tree, each internal node conducts a test on an attribute, each branch represents the
outcome of the test, and the leaf nodes represent the class labels. The paths from
root to leaf represents the classification rules.
In our setting, the internal nodes correspond to one of the aggregated TCP met-
rics being monitored. The learning phase determines the structure of the decision
tree, in terms of the choice of attributes and the order in which they are used for
testing along the path from the root to label (this ordering is determined by the
information gain of features in the dataset). The specific nature of the test at each
node, i.e. the inequality tests, is also determined in this phase.
As noted by prior work [36, 6, 49], the structure of decision trees allows for
further understanding of the attributes that identify each failure. For this reason,
we found decision trees more attractive to use than other machine learning ap-
proaches. We will elaborate further on this in Section 2.5.
Fig. 2.2 shows an example of a decision tree, that distinguishes packet reorder-
ing from normal data. Leaf colors in the figure represent the labels of the training
data that ended up in those leaves. Most leaves are ”pure”, i.e. all the data in
those nodes have the same label. leaf 2 shows an ”impure” leaf that has a mix of
both labels. In such situations, the tree picks the majority label in the leaf as its
diagnosis.
Based on the concept of decision trees, our learning agent requires three en-
hancements for improved stability and accuracy:
Random forests. Our learning agent uses an enhanced type of decision tree, known
as random forests [26]3. In random forests, multiple decision trees are generated
3Version 4.6-10 in R version 3.2.1.
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Figure 2.2: Example tree. The white/Black leave colors illustrate the labels of the
training data that end up in that leaf.
from different subsets of the data, and the classification decision is majority-based,
where a majority is defined based on a cutoff fraction specified by the user. For
example, a cut-off of (0.2, 0.8) indicates that for class 1 to be chosen as the label,
at least, 20% of the trees in the forest need to output 1 as the label as well. Ran-
dom forests improve stability and accuracy in the face of differences in machine
characteristics and outliers.
Multi-round classification. To improve accuracy, we do rounds of classifications.
First, the forest is trained to classify Network failures only. The Server and Client
failures in the training set are labeled as non-faulty (Normal) in this phase. Next,
the Network failure data is removed from the training set, and a new forest is
trained to find Server failures with Client failures labeled as Normal. Finally, the
Server data is also removed and a forest is trained to identify client-side failures.
At run time, data is first passed through the first forest, if classified as Network,
the process terminates. If it is classified as Normal, it is passed through the second
17
2.4. Description of NetPoirot
forest. Again, if it is classified as Server failure the process terminates. If not, the
data is passed through the third forest and is assigned a label of Normal/Client. In
machine learning, such multi-round classifications are referred to as tournaments.
In traditional tournaments, different decision trees are used in pair-wise competi-
tions. Our tournament strategy is a modification of standard tournaments, as they
did not work well in our setting.
Per-application training. Applications react to failures differently. One application
may choose to open more TCP connections when its attempts on existing connec-
tions fail while others may keep retrying on the ones currently open. Some form
of normalization, such as that we use for the monitoring agent, helps avoid depen-
dence on the transmission rate of the client itself. However, it does not help avoid
this particular problem given that the effects of application behavior go beyond the
transmission rate but also influence the number of connections, their duration, etc.
Indeed, these behaviors themselves improve NetPoirot ’s accuracy as they provide
more information about the failure. Hence, it is advised to train NetPoirot for each
application separately. We argue that unless applications change drastically on a
daily basis, there is sufficient time in between major application code releases and
deploys for the model to be updated.
Two-phase tree construction with cross-validation. Each forest is constructed in
two phases. First, given the training set, we determine basic parameters of the
forest, e.g., its cutoff value and a minimum number of data points required in a
leaf node. The latter is required to bound the tree sizes and to avoid overfitting.
Once these parameters are determined, the training set is used to create the actual
forest.
One of the pitfalls of any machine learning algorithm is the danger of overfit-
ting, where the trained model is tailored to explicitly fit the subsequent testing set.
This leads to poor future predictive performance. To avoid overfitting, we apply a
standard machine learning technique, namely a modified variant of cross validation
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(CV). In a nutshell, the first phase is accomplished using N-fold [28] CV which es-
timates error using subsets of the training data, while the second phase builds the
model using all the training data.
In the classic form of N-fold CV, the training data is randomly divided into N
subsets (folds). Iterating over all folds i, in each iteration i is omitted from the
training set and the model is trained over the remaining N − 1 folds. The trained
model is then tested using the ith fold. The estimated errors in each iteration are
averaged to provide an estimate of the model’s accuracy. N-Fold cross-validation,
however, if used on our data set runs the danger of overestimating accuracy as
models will learn specific machine/network characteristics when data from one
machine leaks between folds. Therefore, we divide data from each machine into its
own unique fold. We define CV error as the average error of CV when each fold
contains data from a single machine.
To show why this is important, we tested cross-validation on our data set using
both methods4. Using vanilla cross-validation, we observe an error of 1.5%. How-
ever, when we partition the data based on machine label, we get 10.55% error. This
further indicates that if data from the same machine is used for both training and
at runtime one may get much higher predictive accuracy than those reported in
this paper.
Normalization. We normalize TCP statistics that depend on the data being sent.
Namely, features marked with (∗) in Table 2.2 were divided by the number of bytes
posted by the application in that epoch in order to minimize dependency on the
application’s transmission pattern.
4This was done without the use of tournaments.
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2.5 TCP Behavior under Faults
The hypothesis behind NetPoirot is that the different types of failures, albeit not
network related, cause TCP to react differently. To study this further, we examine
the changes in various TCP parameters in the presence of different failures. De-
cision trees allow for not only classifying faults, but also illuminating features (in
this case TCP metrics) affected by each failure. It is this basis that allows us to
develop NetPoirot and why we use decision trees in this section.
The algorithm used in NetPoirot is agnostic to the choice of decision tree algo-
rithm as we use random forests which rely on weak classifiers as their basis. With
regards to the results in this section, we experimented with different types of de-
cision trees, and will present our results based on a decision tree algorithm called
C5.0 [83]. We used the 0.1.0.24 version of C5.0 in the 3.2.1 version of R. C5.0 is based
on information gain and aims to greedily reduce the amount of uncertainty with re-
spect to the data’s label. Nodes higher up the tree provide the most information
gain (the most reduction in uncertainty) with respect to the output.
For each type of failure, we train a decision tree from data that includes that fail-
ure as well as Normal data. For each failure, we select the top three TCP metrics
(features) in the tree. For each of these top features, we also measure the corre-
lation between its value and the actual ground truth. This is done by computing
the Pearson correlation (PC) between each feature value and the corresponding
ground truth label (encoded as 0 for normal, and 1 for faulty) when that feature
value was recorded. The PC value is then computed across all epochs for the du-
ration in which the failure occurs.
PC is a measure of the linear correlation between the feature values and the
labels (failure type/Normal) and provides further insight into the level of (linear)
dependency between the features. PC’s value ranges between (−1, 1). The closer
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the absolute PC is to 1, the higher the linear correlation and therefore the easier it
is to identify such correlations.
While PC is not required by NetPoirot for classification, we calculate the PC
value so as to provide insight into how easy it would be for an operator to simply
decipher the relationship between the failure and the metrics used by the decision
tree. The human brain is relatively good at identifying linear relationships be-
tween variables. Our results show that often times, the relationship is non-linear,
meaning that a manual classification approach is not likely to work.
2.5.1 Fault Injection and Application Workloads
Failure injection. Supervised learning requires labeled data for training. In or-
der to train our model, we injected failures in the communication pattern of two
different types of applications running on a subset(30) of the VMs in four of our
production data centers located in West and Central USA, North and West Europe.
Our network serves over 1 billion customers and handles petabytes of traffic per
day. Given that networks in a data center environment are highly symmetric, train-
ing on a small subset of machines in a given cluster is sufficient for high accuracies
at runtime. Some data centers already purposefully inject faults on a regular basis
in their production environment in order to evaluate their degree of fault toler-
ance [129]. The traffic of the nodes in the path of these failures can be observed for
training purposes.
Application workload. Applications are designed with a degree of fault tolerance,
and, therefore, react to any failures that might occur. To isolate the impact of fail-
ures on TCP behavior (and not applications), we experiment using two applica-
tions that were designed to remain passive when failures occur. The first is a duplex
application, where we recorded a hypervisor’s communication to a remote service
(the one that causes EX) for 6 hours. This trace is then replayed to and from the
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server. There is no fault tolerance logic in the application. The second application
is a simplex application that opens 128 connections5 to a server and sends a constant
number of bytes on each connection every second. We use three sending rates: 100,
500, 10000 Bps.
These applications are designed to capture the worst case performance of Net-
Poirot . For example, the simplex application involves communication in one di-
rection. Therefore, some metrics that depend on communication from the server
back to the client would not be captured. The duplex application, on the other
hand, is an extreme application that does not react to failures. Overall, the simplex
application results in decision trees with higher CV errors ( Section 2.4.2) as a result
of fewer metrics being influenced by the failure.
Our data is gathered over a period of 6 months (July-December 2015). All
datasets are labeled with the corresponding machine ID where the data is collected,
to be used for cross-validation (CV) described in Section 2.4.2.
2.5.2 Results
We inject failures listed in Table 2.1 to study their impact on TCP. Tables 2.3 and 2.4
summarize our main findings. Each row corresponds to the top three features se-
lected by a decision tree trained on the input dataset. For each feature, we include
in parenthesis () the corresponding PC value as described earlier. We also measure
the CV error, which represents the accuracy of the decision tree. For the purpose of
this section, we do not apply the normalization described in Section 2.4.2 in order
to gain more visibility into the direct impact of TCP on the raw metrics.
We observe that each type of failure can be defined succinctly using a few fea-
tures. To validate this, we used a standard machine learning technique, Principal
Component Analysis (PCA) [111], where we identify the highest Eigenvalues of the
5This number is based on the number of connections opened by clients connecting to one of
our services.
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General
label
Fault Features Selected CV
Err
Server
High CPU load
on server
Probingsd(PC=0.27)
Timeouts95(PC=0.009)
Duration50(PC=0.22)
6%
Slow reading
server
LCWNDmin(PC=0.78)
Duration50(PC=0.21)
Durationmax(PC=0.15)
3%
High I/O on
server
BDelivered95(PC=0.58)
BReceivedmax(PC=−0.72)
0.2%
High memory
load on server
BDeliveredTOBReceived(PC=0.01)
BReceived(PC=−0.74)
0.1%
Client
High CPU load
on client
Duration95(PC=−0.33)
Duration50(PC=−0.03)
Durationmin(PC=0.4)
0.6%
High I/O on
client
BReceivedmax(PC=−0.75)
Probingsd(PC=−0.61)
BDeliveredToBReceived95(PC=0.01)
1.7%
High memory
load on client
BReceivedmax(PC=−0.82)
LCWND10(PC=0.24)
BDelivered95(PC=0.3)
15%
Network
Bandwidth throt-
tling
BReceivedmax(PC=−0.78)
Durationsd(PC=−0.14)
BDelivered95(PC=0.26)
0.05%
Sporadic packet
drops
BReceivedmax(−0.73)
MRTTmax(0.12)
BDelivered10(0.34)
3%
Packet reordering MCWNDmean(PC=−0.07)
MCWNDsd(PC=0.01)
TDupAcks95(PC=0.79)
0.1%
Latency MRTTmean (PC=0.91) 0
Table 2.3: Important features in identifying failures for the duplex application.
Statistics proceed the variable name.
dataset for each failure type. The sum of the Eigenvalues of a dataset equals its
variance. Interestingly, for almost all failures, the sum of the 2 highest Eigenvalues
captured more than 95% of the variance in the feature set. This is important as it
shows that the space of each failure (as represented by TCP metrics) is compactly
representable on two dimensions6.
We next discuss interesting highlights of our analysis.
High CPU load on the server. This failure was induced by a multithreaded pro-
gram, where each thread performed a CPU intensive system level operation in a
loop. For the duplex application, the algorithm used the standard deviation of the
time spent in zero window probing as its top feature. Zero window probing oc-
6These dimensions can be derived from the original features using PCA.
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curs on the client when the server runs out of receive buffer. In the presence of
high CPU load, the server would not read from the receive buffer as regularly as
normal operations resulting in higher variance in the size of the receive buffer and
by extension the time spent in zero window probing at the client.
Slow reading server Detecting a slow reading server should be simple in principle
if it results in zero window probing. We induced a random delay of 0-100ms be-
fore the server reads from the TCP socket in order to test this theory. Surprisingly,
the decision trees use measures of the congestion window and duration instead. It
seems that the secondary effect of the delay was more pronounced on these met-
rics.
High I/O load on the client side. To induce high I/O load, we use the SQLIO
tool [92] from Microsoft. High I/O load on the client has all the markings of an
application limited connection. The decision trees both use the maximum of BRe-
ceived, the standard deviation of the time spent in zero window probing, as well
as the 95th percentile of the ratio of BDeliveredToBReceived.
High memory usage on the server. The selected values point directly towards
a problem on the server, these values include the 95th percentile of BDelivered-
ToBReceived and the maximum of BDelivered. This shows that the reduction in
memory on the server side has caused an impact on the amount of data transmitted
from the server. Note, that such data is not available on the simplex application.
Here, instead the decision tree relies on the number of connections, as well as the
congestion window related metrics in order to do classification.
High memory usage on client. As part of our analysis, for all the failures, we
used fast correlation-based filters for feature selection and compared the results
with the top 3 features of the decision tree. We found that feature selection for
this particular failure returned an unexpected subset of the features. It returned
the mean time spent in zero window probing and its standard deviation. On all
machines, the client had zero Probingmean when the memory usage on the client
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General
label
Fault Features Selected CV
Err.
Server
High CPU load
on server
MRTT10(PC=0.87),
MRTTsd(PC=−0.12),
Timeoutssd(PC=0.03)
1.2%
Slow reading
server
NumberofFlows(PC=−0.22),
DCWNDsd(PC=0.16),
LCWND95(PC=0.37)
13%
High I/O on
server
NumberofFlows(PC=−0.08),
MCWNDmax(PC=0.11),
LCWNDmax(PC=0.46)
14%
High memory
load on server
NumberofFlows(PC=−0.04),
DCWNDsd(PC=0.08),
LCWNDmax(PC=0.49)
16%
Client
High CPU load
on client
MCWND10(PC=−0.07),
BpostedtoSentmin(PC=−0.05)
0%
High I/O on
client
NumberofFlows (PC=0.32),
MCWNDmean(PC=−0.31)
15%
High memory
load on client
NumberofFlows (PC=0.57),
MRTTmax(PC=−0.47)
13%
Network
Bandwidth throt-
tling
NLossRecovery95(PC=0.66) 0.02%
Sporadic packet
drops
MCWND95(PC=−0.47),
BPostedmean(PC=0.24),
Durationmin(PC=−0.07)
4%
Latency MRTTmax(PC=0.94) 0.02%
Table 2.4: The important features for identifying each type of failure in the simplex
application.
was increased, whereas it was positive in the normal data. The client, having less
memory, is pushing less data to the server allowing it to “keep up”.
Packet drops. Using a commercial tool called SoftPerfect [4], we induce 5, 10, and
30 percent packet drop rates on all connections to the service. Metrics pointing to
TCP throughput are those mostly used to identify the failure. While packet drops
do result in a decrease in throughput it is surprising that DupAcks are not the
most prominent metric. Indeed, the maximum number of BReceived has twice as
high information gain than any of the DupAck statistics. We plotted the CDF’s for
both these metrics. Both showed a significant difference between failure/normal
data. And therefore, we can only explain this choice by noting that the impact
of BRecieved had a more pronounced effect on information gain compared to the
number of DupAcks.
Connection drops. This type of failure is one of the easiest for our classification
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tool to identify as tracking SYN, SYN/ACK ETW events suffice in understanding
whether all or only a random subset of connections are being dropped. Thus, these
failures are identified with 100% accuracy. With clear indicators, that identify why
they occur.
Overall takeaways. TCP reacts differently to different failures. Therefore, the top
three features selected by the decision tree also vary across failures. PC values
are not a good predictor of the importance of TCP metrics. In fact, the top three
features on occasion have low absolute PC values, suggesting that the relation-
ship between faults and TCP metrics may be more complex than a straightforward
linear one. This makes manual classification difficult and motivates the need for
automated approaches.
2.6 Evaluation
We have developed a prototype of NetPoirot , which we deployed in a production
data center with failure injection and application workloads as described in Sec-
tion 2.5.1. The focus of our evaluation is to measure the accuracy of NetPoirot in
identifying each failure type. To this end, we compute the confusion matrix [27] of
the test set on the trained model. A confusion matrix illustrates what each class of
failure in the test set is classified as by NetPoirot .
Within each class, we further report the precision and recall, defined as follows:
Precision is defined as the ratio of true positives divided by the sum of true posi-
tives and false positives. It is a measure of reliability. For example, if the precision
of the network failures are reported as 96%, it means that when NetPoirot allocates
responsibility to the network for a failure it is the culprit with 96% likelihood.
Recall is the ratio of true positives to the actual number of instances in a class and
is a measure of NetPoirot ’s ability to recognize that an entity is indeed responsible
for a failure.
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We will first describe the performance of NetPoirot when only TCP metrics
from the client side are used. We then show that by augmenting network infor-
mation with high-level counters, e.g. CPU load, on the same client machine one can
achieve almost perfect classification.
We use the workload described in Section 2.5 and partition the measured data
into two sets for training and testing. The partition is done by using disjoint sets
of machines for the training and test sets in order to avoid any bias in favor of
NetPoirot . The datasets used for training and testing are roughly the same size
and contain aggregated information for over 37 million connections.
General
label
Fault P (fault |
error ∩
General label)
P (error |
fault)
Server
High CPU load on
sever
66.36% 24%
Slow reading server 2.81% 4.06%
High I/O on server 6.36% 9.66%
High memory load
on server
24% 17.51%
Client
High CPU load on
client
4.78% 9.86%
High I/O on client 33% 17.61%
High memory load
on client
61.52% 11.2%
Network
Bandwidth throttling 96.06% 20.06%
Sporadic packet
drops
0.21% 0.13%
Packet reordering 3.71% 1.52%
Latency 0 0
Table 2.5: The classification errors of NetPoirot in each general label broken down
in terms of faults.
2.6.1 Overall Accuracy and Confusion Matrix
Duplex application. Fig. 2.3 shows the confusion matrix of NetPoirot when
tested on the duplex application. We focus here on identifying the entity responsi-
ble for a failure. This could be the Client, Server, Network, or Normal (non-failure).
Individual failure classification is deferred to Section 2.6.2. For better visualization,
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we show the confusion matrix as a bar graph in each class, where labels on the x-
axis show the ground truth. The bars show what each failure was classified as by
NetPoirot . The bar matching the ground truth label on the x-axis represents the
value of recall. For example, Normal (green bar) has a high recall value close to
100% (height of the green bar). Precision values are reported on the x-axis next to
the ground truth labels in parenthesis.
We make the following observations. First, network failures are the easiest to
diagnose from TCP statistics and the most reliable among the three types of failure
classes. NetPoirot has 99% precision for network failures, indicating that an output
of “Network” from NetPoirot can be trusted. Server failures are the hardest to
identify, given the lack of direct access to server side information. Recall was 82%
for these failures, with the majority of errors going to Normal.
To understand the source of our errors, we looked into the specifics of the mis-
classified subclasses. Table 2.5 shows this information, limited to the misclassified
data points from Fig. 2.3. P (fault | error ∩General label) describes the probability
of a failure given that it was erroneously classified by NetPoirot and that it be-
longed to a particular class (Network/Server/Client). In other words, this column
shows the breakdown of the error in each class to show how much was attributed
to each particular failure. The second column, P (error | fault), shows the proba-
bility of classification error given a failure type. This shows the likelihood that a
failure of a particular type will be misclassified by NetPoirot .
As can be seen, the error within each class is usually less than 20%. However,
High CPU load on server seems to be the most problematic failure type with 24%
misclassification as normal data. Also, note that even though Network failures
have a high recall of 90%(as shown in Fig. 2.3), almost all the error in the remaining
10% can be attributed to bandwidth throttling. We found that within this failure,
throttling at 50 and 1 Mbps caused the most problems as they did not significantly
disrupt application performance.
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The above shows the performance of NetPoirot when it relies only on TCP met-
rics from the client side. We can achieve near 100% precision/recall on Server and
Client failures by augmenting network information with CPU/IO/Memory load
from only the client machine (this is indicated by the high precision in the Network
class). We can then locally check whether a client-side problem has occurred. If
not, NetPoirot can check whether the failure is due to a Network problem. If both
tests are negative, by elimination, the Server is the cause of failure. Note that sim-
ply relying on client information without TCP metrics (and NetPoirot ) would not
work – it would provide high precision/recall for client failures but fail (0% recall)
for all other failures.
Finally, NetPoirot exhibits high precision in all classes of failures indicating
that the entity output by NetPoirot can be trusted with high probability as the
source of the failure.
Simplex application. The duplex application shows the worst case performance
of NetPoirot on typical applications that have bidirectional communication. We
also examine a more extreme situation where data is only transmitted from the
client machine. Fig. 2.4 shows that while precision and recall remain high for
network failures, it is more difficult to differentiate between Client/Normal and
Server/Normal. We note, however, that the errors are not uniformly spread across
all failures. In fact, NetPoirot achieved a recall of 99.9% in detecting high CPU load
on the server. However, high I/O and high memory on the server side contribute
to the majority of the misclassifications. This is because the simplex application
lacks information that relates to data transmitted by the remote application, given
that communication is only in one direction. To understand why this information
is critical, we observe from Table 2.3 that in the case of the duplex application, the
amount of data transmitted by the remote application (BReceived) plays a signifi-
cant role in identifying the failure related to high memory on the server side.
We present the simplex application as an extreme scenario. Given that most
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applications have bidirectional communication similar to the duplex application,
we focus on the duplex application for the rest of this section.
Figure 2.3: Confusion matrix on the duplex application’s failure. Recall on each
class is as follows: Normal: 97.94%,Client: 87.32%,Server: 81.89%, Network: 90%.
Precision values are included in the x axis for each class.
2.6.2 Individual Failure Classification
NetPoirot is primarily designed to identify the entity responsible for a failure. As
a more ambitious goal, it is highly desirable to also identify the actual failure type
itself. To test the extent to which NetPoirot can accurately classify specific fail-
ures (as opposed to responsible entities), once the failure class is identified (Sec-
tion 2.6.1), we use detailed failure labels to train an additional diagnosis function
to identify the type of failure within the entity. The results are shown in Table 2.6.
The third column only uses TCP metrics at the client, while the fourth column
includes additional client-side information such as CPU, IO, and memory.
Table 2.6 shows that NetPoirot can classify the majority of failures, particularly
on the network and server. In fact, NetPoirot is accurate enough in these classes
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Figure 2.4: Confusion matrix on the simplex application’s failure. Recall on each
class is as follows: Normal: 78%,Client: 47%,Server: 55%, Network: 95.4%. Preci-
sion values are included in the x axis for each class.
so that we simply used a standard random forest trained for the failures with-
out having to resort to running tournaments. For the client side failures, however,
NetPoirot does not perform as well and we have to run tournaments. Distinguish-
ing between high I/O and memory load on both the client and server proved ex-
tremely difficult without client-side information as TCP behavior remains largely
the same in the presence of either failure. They are presented as a single class in
Table 6. We note that, simply by augmenting the TCP statistics used by NetPoirot
with client-side information, one can achieve high accuracy in identifying the in-
dividual failure type.
2.6.3 Untrained Failures
NetPoirot ’s design is based on supervised learning and thus requires labeled data
for training. This means that it should not be able to detect failures for which
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General
label
Fault With only client net-
work stats
With all client stats
Server side
High CPU
load on server
Precision:99.69%,
Recall:75.54%
Precision:99.78%, Re-
call: 76%
Slow reading
server
Precision:83.21%,
Recall:95.66%
Precision:83.63%,
Recall:96.44%
High I/O or
Memory on
Server
Precision:65.78%,
Recall:98.75%
Precision:76.97%,
Recall:98.75%
Client side High CPUload on client
Precision:75.64%,
Recall:88.05%
Precision:100%,
Recall:100%
High I/O or
Memory on
Client
Precision:82.63%,
Recall:98.48
Precision:100%,
Recall:100%
Network
Bandwidth
throttling
Precision:91.4%,
Recall:79.94%
Precision:92.14%,
Recall:85.53%
Sporadic
packet drops
Precision: 75.54%,
Recall: 97.72%
Precision: 75.54%,
Recall: 97.72%
Packet re-
ordering
Precision: 99.73%,
Recall: 66.53%
Precision: 99.73%,
Recall: 66.84%
Latency Precision:99.47%, Re-
call: 100%
Precision: 99.47%,
Recall=100%
Table 2.6: Detailed fault classification with and without additional client side in-
formation.
it was not specifically trained. Thus, it is important to understand NetPoirot ’s
typical behavior in the presence of such failures. The situation can occur in one of
the following two ways:
Dormant failures: A previously unknown type of failure is present during training
and is labeled as Normal.
Unknown failures: A failure occurs for the first time during runtime.
While we cannot anticipate what the “unknown/dormant” failures would be,
we attempt to illustrate this behavior by purposefully changing our original train-
ing data to reflect each of these behaviors. Ideally, we would like these failures to
be either classified as Normal by NetPoirot , or as their ground truth class (actual
entity).
To emulate dormant failures, we deliberately mislabeled each class in our train-
ing data as Normal before training NetPoirot . Similarly, to emulate unknown fail-
ures, we remove failed classes from the training data. We then investigate what
entity will be output as being responsible for these unknown failures. Fig. 2.5
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Figure 2.5: NetPoirot performance on dormant and unknown failures, when all
client statistics are used.
shows that dormant failures result in most of the dormant failure being classified
as Normal (what we are hoping for). This shows that in the presence of dormant
failures, an output of Normal from NetPoirot may require further investigation to
uncover the source of the problem. Fig. 2.5 also shows that NetPoirot is resilient
to unknown failures, as failures from each entity have similar characteristics7. In
the few failure types where significant misclassifications occur, they usually result
in classification to Normal.
2.6.4 Sensitivity Analysis
We do a series of sensitive analysis to explore NetPoirot ’s ability to detect failures
across data centers.
So far we have shown the accuracy of NetPoirot when the data center locations
7Fig. 2.5 shows the results for when both client and network statistics are used. Our results
showed that NetPoirot performed almost equally as well when using only network information.
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of the machines used for testing only partially overlap with those used in training.
Here we investigate whether the location of the machines used for training and
testing influences the performance of NetPoirot .
Sensitivity to Cross Data-center Effects. In this experiment, we train NetPoirot
for the duplex application using client machines in data centers on the west coast
and one of the southern states. We then test the result on data from machines in
the same southern state, and also on those in a midwest data center. Table 2.7
summarizes the precision and recall for test data collected for two machines in the
southern data center, and two machines in the midwest. We observe that NetPoirot
is mostly resilient to the location on which it has been trained. Interestingly, server-
side failures are the most sensitive to location. We conjecture that this may be
caused by cross-traffic effects as RTT variance increases. Further investigation is
needed as part of our future work.
General label Southern State Midwest
Normal Precision: 98.85% Re-
call: 98.2%
Precision: 83.34% Re-
call: 99.07%
Client Precision: 100% Re-
call: 100%
Precision: 100% Re-
call: 100%
Server Precision: 84.71% Re-
call: 94.67%
Precision: 97.75% Re-
call: 78.91%
Network Precision: 98.85% Re-
call: 88.99%
Precision: 100% Re-
call: 98.82
Table 2.7: Performance breakdown by machine location. All client statistics are
used for classification.
Sensitivity To Failure Duration. We next investigate NetPoirot ’s ability to identify
short-lived failures. Table 2.8 summarizes our results for three failures (high IO at
server, high IO at client, and high network latency). For training, we use failures
that last for the application’s lifetime. For each test case, we inject failures with
durations ranging from less than 30 seconds, to 5 to 6 minutes. We allow at least
a 15 minute gap between each failure. Our results indicate that NetPoirot is not
overly sensitive to the duration of the failure. Note the relatively higher accuracy
in identifying high I/O on the server side as compared to Table 2.5. This is because
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the VMs we use for testing and training in this scenario are all from the same data
centers.
Duration Client (High IO) Server (High IO) Network (High Latency)
< 30s 100% 100% 100%
[30s,1min] 100% 99.99 100%
[1, 3]min 100% 96.96% 97%
[3, 5] min 100% 99% 100%
[5, 6] min 100% 96.01% 100%
Table 2.8: Sensitivity to failure duration. Recall numbers are shown here.
Sensitivity to Per-connection Training. NetPoirot is trained on a per-application
basis, where the decision-tree based forests are built using TCP metrics aggre-
gated across all connections of an application to the same service. This aggregation
method has three advantages: 1) It allows us to take advantage of the differences
across connections to better detect failures, 2) It allows us to capture an applica-
tion’s reaction to failure, and 3) It reduces the runtime/training overhead of Net-
Poirot .
General
label
Normal Client Server Network
Precision 74.2% 100% 48.16% 89.53%
Recall 85.77% 100% 41.46% 77.82%
Table 2.9: Performance of NetPoirot when used for per connection classification.
We explore another method of training, where we build the forest on a per-
connection basis. Table 2.9 shows the precision/recall achieved by NetPoirot , on
failure detection using the duplex application. Here, NetPoirot is trained using
per-connection metrics. We observe that training on a per-connection basis re-
quires 100X increased learning time. Hence, we are restricted to only 40% of the
earlier training set. We observe that the recall and precision numbers are lower.
For example, server-side failures are the hardest to classify, with a recall of 41.46%.
Overall, per-application aggregation is a more accurate and efficient approach, and
the alternative approach should only be considered if the operator requires per-
connection diagnostics information.
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2.6.5 Real Application Analysis
Our test applications present challenging scenarios that help us explore the limits
of NetPoirot ’s ability to detect failures. As noted in Section 2.5.1, these are extreme
applications as they do not modify their communication patterns in response to
failures. Here, we explore the performance of NetPoirot on two real-world ap-
plications, one based on video streaming, and another based on traces from our
production data center containing EX failures.
YouTube video streaming. We tested NetPoirot on data collected while streaming
YouTube videos in a browser. On 9 of our VM’s located in three different data cen-
ters, we induced Client and Network failures8 while streaming YouTube Videos.
Table 2.10 shows the results for when only network statistics are used. Compared
to our results in Section 2.6.1, we observe that NetPoirot does significantly better
on the streaming application than on the duplex and simplex applications.
General
label
Normal Client Network
Precision 97.78% 99.7% 100%
Recall 99.68% 98.25% 99.37%
Table 2.10: Performance of NetPoirot when used to identify failures when stream-
ing YouTube videos.
Production applications experiencing EX. We run an experiment to validate Net-
Poirot ’s effectiveness in identifying causes of EX failures based on real production
traces. We use Syslog entries from our production machines to identify when an
EX event caused a VM reboot. As training and test sets, we extract information
captured by our monitoring agent,which is deployed on all compute nodes in our
data centers, during the same time period . The monitoring agent used to cap-
ture this data is an older version of NetPoirot and does not report metrics such as
time spent in zero window probing which we added in subsequent releases. We
additionally use resolved tickets to identify the cause of failures.
8Server failures are excluded as we do not control the servers.
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We use a large subset of machines (162/175) for training as EX occurrences on
any one machine tend to be low (typically at most 1), though in aggregate, they
occur frequently. The remaining machines are used for testing. We lack direct
access to the ground truth labels and have to use a combination of log analysis and
resolved tickets to identify the start-time/type of the failure that lead to EX. Note
that in a real-world deployment, we would have injected faults as described in
Section 2.3 in the training phase to induce and learn about all types of EX failures,
leading to a more accurate failure labeling process.
Figure 2.6: Confusion matrix on EX. Recall on each class is as follows: Normal:
94.53%,Client: 98.54%, Server: 100%,Network: 98.2%.
In the training set, we mark the duration of each failure based on a simple
heuristic. We know when the failure ended as the VM experiencing EX reboots
(detectable from Syslog), we set the failure start time to 3 minutes prior to this
reboot. We do not use data after the reboot. 3 minutes is a conservative estimate
that we apply. However, this is at best an estimate. After talking to operators of
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a large scale datacenter, they confirmed that the duration of failures that cause EX
are highly variable and can last from a couple of seconds to minutes.
To improve label accuracy, we first pass each class of failure in the test set
through a classifier that identifies that failure (e.g. Client) from Normal data. We
then label the data based on the output as failure/Normal making sure that each
class occurs with contiguous time stamps. Similarly for the data that we label as
normal, based on the 3 minutes time-frame, we first pass it through each of these
classifiers and label it as failure if its timestamp is a continuous extension of the
failure on the same machine. This allows us to extend the failure labeling past the
3 minute conservative estimate.
Fig. 2.6 shows the confusion matrix similar to the format described in Sec-
tion 2.6.1. Since client information was not collected, the results are based on Net-
Poirot when using network statistics alone. We make the following observations.
First, despite lacking the actual ground truth on failures and the time interval in
which they occur, NetPoirot never misclassifies failures as other types of failures.
Second, given course granularity labels of failures vs normal, NetPoirot is able to
achieve very high recall values, consistently above 94%, and in fact, achieves 100%
recall for server failures. This suggests that NetPoirot is a promising approach at
pinpointing the entity causing EX.
2.7 Discussion
Our results in Section 5.4 demonstrates the effectiveness of NetPoirot in pinpoint-
ing the source of failures in a data center. We perform a range of sensitivity anal-
ysis, on different applications to fully explore the efficacy of NetPoirot . In doing
so, we have identified possible extensions of NetPoirot , as well as gained a better
understanding of the scenarios in which it is most useful. We briefly discuss these
possibilities here, as well as point out directions for future extensions.
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NetPoirot uses lightweight endpoint monitoring, is non-intrusive, and incurs
minimal overhead to machines in a data center. Despite being lightweight, Net-
Poirot is able to perform accurate failure detection of the entity responsible for
the failure, and even the type of failure itself. This precludes identification of the
actual device, e.g. the physical router that causes a network problem. Another
limitation of NetPoirot is its reliance on TCP metrics, which precludes failures ob-
served by UDP. Given that most traffic within data center uses TCP, a wide range of
applications (e.g. web apps, database applications) can still benefit from NetPoirot
.
NetPoirot is a lightweight failure identification tool for data center applica-
tions. We have identified several avenues to further improve our results via more
sophisticated learning techniques. These include:
Cross-application learning. NetPoirot requires per-application training, which we
argue is feasible, given that learning can be done offline for each new application
being deployed in a data center. One interesting idea we are exploring is the use
of a concept in machine learning, known as transfer learning [109], in which the
feature space of one application can be modified so that it can be used in NetPoirot
for identifying the cause of failures in another application.
Non-production training. NetPoirot exploits the fact that data centers tend to have
homogeneous setups, where failures can be induced on a subset for machines for
supervised learning. This has been explored by others [129]. As an enhancement,
we plan to explore training in a staging environment. Our sensitivity analysis in
Section 2.6.4 suggests that NetPoirot is resilient to learning across data centers,
suggesting it is possible to limit the training to a single cluster within a data center,
and still apply the results to another cluster with similar configuration.
Improving accuracy. In Section 2.4.2 we reported that traditional CV on our data
set yields an error of 1.5%. Cross-validation error where each fold comprises of
data from only a single machine is much higher (11%). This suggests that if sam-
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ples of faulty/normal data from a machine exist in the training data, the classifi-
cation error on that machine dramatically decreases. Thus, continuously changing
the machines used in training should improve the accuracy of NetPoirot even fur-
ther over time.
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Finding The Device Responsible For
The Failure
In Chapter 2 we introduced NetPoirot, a system which allows for the identification
of the entity responsible for a failure that is completely contained to the end host.
NetPoirot, however, is only the first step in the diagnosis process. Once a network
failure is detected it still remains to detect the link/switch that caused the fail-
ure. For example, during our deployment of NetPoirot in a production datacenter,
we found that on a typical day 17% of VM reboots were due to network related
failures. Such networks are comprised of thousands of links and switches. Thus
finding the cause of failures is often equivalent to finding a needle in the proverbial
haystack.
In this chapter we will outline why state of the art diagnosis algorithms fall
short in identifying the cause of many of such failures and present a new system
Vigil which not only allows for identifying the cause of failures but also allows us
to go one step further and to identify the link most likely to have dropped packets
on each individual TCP connection.
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3.1 Introduction
Vigil started with an ambitious goal: For every TCP retransmission in our data
centers, we wanted to pinpoint the network link that caused the packet drop that
triggered the retransmission with negligible diagnostic overhead or changes to the
networking infrastructure.
This goal may sound like an overkill—after all, TCP is supposed to be able to
deal with a few packet losses. Packet losses might occur due to simple congestion
instead of network equipment failures. Even network failures might be transient.
Above all, there is a danger of drowning in a sea of data without generating any
actionable intelligence.
These objections are valid, but so is the need to diagnose TCP “failures” which
can result in severe problems for applications. For example, in most data centers,
VM images are stored in a storage service. When a customer boots a VM, the im-
age is mounted over the network. Thus, even a small network outage can cause the
host kernel to “panic” and reboot the guest VM. In fact, our observations show that
17% of VM reboots in a production data center were caused by network issues and
in over 70% of these, none of the available monitoring systems were able to pin-
point the link(s) that caused the problem. To illustrate this problem, in a one-day
snapshot, there were on average 10 VM reboots per hour across these data centers
caused by network problems that could not be attributed to a specific network link
or device.
Since VM reboots directly affect the end customer, we place very high value on
understanding their root causes. Any persistent pattern in such transient failures
is a cause for concern and is potentially actionable. An example of such failure is
silent packet drops [65]. Such problems are nearly impossible to detect with tradi-
tional monitoring systems (e.g., SNMP counters). If a switch is experiencing such
problems, we may want to reboot or replace it. Such interventions are “costly”
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in that they affect a large number of flows/VMs. Therefore, we need a system to
correctly assign the blame in face of such transient failures.
There is a lot of prior work in the area of network failure diagnosis and blame
assignment. However, none of the existing systems meet the ambitious goal we
have set for ourselves. Pingmesh [65] sends periodic probes to detect link failures
and can therefore leave “gaps” in coverage, as it must manage the overhead of
probing. Also, since it uses out-of-band probes, it cannot detect failures that affect
only in-band data. NetPoirot, identifies the network as a likely cause of perfor-
mance issues, but cannot find the specific device that causes the problem. Roy
et. al. [119] report a system that monitors all paths in the network for possible
link failures. Their system requires modifications to routers and assumes a specific
topology. Everflow [145] cannot be directly used to pinpoint the location of packet
drop, since it would require capturing all traffic, which is not scalable.
To address these limitations, we propose Vigil, a simple, lightweight, always-on
monitoring tool. Vigil records the path of TCP connections that suffer from one or
more retransmission and assigns a proportional “blame” to each link on the path.
Vigil then provides a ranking of the links that represents their relative packet drop
rates. Using this ranking, it can find the most likely cause of packet drops on each
TCP connection.
Vigil has several noteworthy properties. First, it does not require any changes
to the existing networking infrastructure. Second, it does not require changes to
the client software—the monitoring agent is an independent entity that sits on
the side. Third, Vigil detects in-band failures and is hence more useful than tools
such as Pingmesh [65]. Fourth, Vigil continues to perform well in the presence of
noise, as opposed tools such as to NetDiagnoser [48]. Finally, Vigil’s overhead is
negligible.
While the high-level design of Vigil is deceptively simple, the practical chal-
lenges of making Vigil work and the theoretical challenge of proving that Vigil
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works are non-trivial. For example, its path discovery is based on a traceroute-
like approach. Due to the use of ECMP, traceroute packets have to be carefully
crafted to ensure that they follow the same path as the TCP connection. Also, we
needed to ensure that we do not overwhelm the routers along the path by sending
too many traceroutes (traceroute responses are handled by control-plane CPUs of
the routers, which are quite puny). To this end, we had to do careful calculations to
ensure that our sampling strikes the right balance between the need for accuracy
and the overhead on the switches. On the theoretical side, we are able to show that
Vigil’s simple blame assignment scheme is highly accurate even in the presence of
noise.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions: (i) we design Vigil,
a simple, lightweight, and yet accurate fault localization system for data center
networks; (ii) we prove that Vigil is accurate without imposing excessive burden
on the switches; (iii) we prove that the simple blame assignment scheme used by
Vigil correctly finds the failed links with high probability; and (iv) we show how
to tackle numerous practical challenges involved in deploying Vigil in a real data
center.
Our results from deploying Vigil in a tier-1 data center show that it detects
every problem identified by other previously deployed monitoring services while
also pinpointing the sources of problems for which information is not provided by
these monitoring services.
3.2 Problem and challenges
The goal of Vigil is to identify the cause of TCP retransmissions with high probabil-
ity. Our current focus is mainly on infrastructure traffic, especially connections to
services such as storage as these can have the most severe consequence (see §3.1).
Note that we are deliberately not excluding congestion-induced retransmissions.
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Figure 3.1: Simple tomography example, where a simple optimization problem
can find the problematic link.
If episodes of congestion (however short-lived) are common on a link, we want to
be able to flag them. Of course, in practice, any such system needs to deal with a
certain amount of “noise”—which we will formalize later.
The design of Vigil is driven by two practical requirements: (i) it should scale to
data center size networks and (ii) it should be deployable in a running data center
with as little change to the infrastructure as possible.
Generally, there are three ways to monitor link failures to determine the cause
of packet drops. First, one can continuously monitor switch counters. These are,
however, inherently unreliable [136] and monitoring thousands of switches in a
data center at a fine time granularity is not scalable. Having to correlate this data
with each TCP retransmission significantly exacerbates this problem. Second, one
can use a system like PingMesh [65] that sends probe packets to monitor link sta-
tus. Such systems suffer from a rate of probing trade-off: sending too many probes
creates unacceptable overhead whereas reducing the probing rate leaves temporal
and spatial gaps in coverage. More importantly, the probe traffic does not capture
what the end user and the TCP connections see. Thus, we choose the third alter-
native, which is to use data traffic itself as probe traffic [119]. Using data traffic has
the advantage that the system introduces little or no monitoring overhead.
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As one might expect, almost all traffic in our data centers is TCP traffic. One
way to monitor this type of traffic is to use a system like Everflow. Everflow in-
serts a special tag in every packet and has the switches mirror tagged packets to
special collection servers. Thus, if a tagged packet is dropped, we can easily de-
termine the link on which it happened. Unfortunately, there is no way to know in
advance which packet is going to be dropped, so we would have to tag and mirror
every single TCP packet. This is clearly infeasible. We could tag only a fraction of
packets, but doing so would result in another sampling rate trade-off.
Hence, it follows that we must rely on some form of network tomography [143,
71, 85]. We can take advantage of the fact that TCP is a connection-oriented, reliable
delivery protocol, so that any packet loss results in retransmission1,which can be
easily detected. If we knew the path of every TCP connection, we can set up a
standard optimization problem to determine, with high confidence, which link
may have dropped the packet. For example, in Figure 3.1, the link between nodes
2 and 4 is lossy and drops packets. As a result, connections 1-2, and 3-2 suffer
from retransmissions, but connection 1-3 does not. A straightforward set cover
optimization formulation that attempts to minimize the number of “blamed” links
will correctly identify the cause of drops on each TCP connection.
Still, there are two issues with this approach: (i) the optimization problem is
known to be NP-hard [22] and solving it on the data-center scale is not feasible;
(ii) tracking the path of every single TCP connection in the data center is not scal-
able in our setting.
One can use alternative solutions such as using Everflow to track the path of
SYN packets or use a system like the one described in [119]. However, both these
schemes rely on making changes to the switches. The only way to capture the
path of a TCP connection without making any special infrastructure support is to
run something like a traceroute. However, traceroute relies on getting ICMP TTL
1False retransmissions are rare and we handle them (§3.4).
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exceeded messages back from the switches. These messages are generated by the
control plane, i.e., the switch CPU, not the ASIC that drives the dataplane. To avoid
overloading the CPU, our datacenter administrators have capped the rate of ICMP
responses to 100 per second. This severely limits the number of TCP connections
we can track.
Given these limitations, what can we do? In this paper, we show that the an-
swer, for data center networks, is deceptively simple. We show that if (a) we track
the path only of those TCP connections that have suffered retransmissions, (b) as-
sign each link on the path of such a connection a vote of 1/h, where h is the path
length, and (c) sum up the votes during a given period, then the top-voted links
are almost always the ones that are dropping packets (see §3.5)! Unlike the solu-
tion of the optimization problem, our scheme is able to provide a ranking of the
links in term of their drop rates, i.e. if link A has a higher total vote than B, it is
also dropping more packets (with high probability). This allows Vigil to find the
link most likely responsible for each connection’s packet drops.
In the next three sections, we describe Vigil in more detail, beginning with an
overview of its architecture.
3.3 Design Overview
Figure 3.2 shows the overall architecture of Vigil. Within our data centers, Vigil
is deployed side-by-side with other applications on each end-host as a user-level
process running in the host OS. Vigil (shown in light purple/gray) consists of three
agents for TCP monitoring, path discovery, and analysis.
At a high level, the TCP monitoring agent detects potential retransmissions at
each end-host. The TCP monitoring agent is deployed on all end hosts in the data
center. The Event Tracing For Windows (ETW) [91] framework2 notifies the agent
2Similar functionality exists in Linux.
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Figure 3.2: Overview of Vigil architecture
as soon as an active TCP connection established by the host suffers a retransmis-
sion (Vigil currently does not monitor TCP connections in the VMs).
Upon a retransmission, the TCP monitoring agent then triggers the path discov-
ery agent (§3.4) to identify the set of links along this connection. The path discovery
agent uses a modified version of traceroute to discover this path to the destination
IP (DIP).
At each end-host, at regular intervals (30 seconds in our implementation), the
voting scheme described in §3.5 is carried out based on the reported paths of con-
nections that suffered retransmission within the epoch. The results of the vote is
sent to a centralized analysis agent to identify the top-voted links across the entire
data center.
Overall, the Vigil implementation consists of 6000 lines of C code at the end-
host. The analysis engine contains an additional several hundred lines of code. Its
memory usage never goes beyond 6 KB on any of our production hosts and its CPU
utilization is minimal (+1% overhead for each core). The bandwidth utilization of
Vigil due to traceroute is minimal (maximum of 200 KBps per host). As our results
will show, Vigil can determine the most likely culprit for each connection, even
with loss rates as low as 0.05%.
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We now describe the path discovery agent and the analysis agent in more de-
tail.
3.4 The path discovery agent
The path discovery agent uses traceroute functionality to discover the path of TCP
connections that suffer retransmissions. We first ensure that the number of tracer-
outes sent by the agent does not overload our switches (§3.4.1). We then briefly
describe the key engineering issues and how we solve them (§3.4.2). Our data cen-
ters use IP routing and thus the path discovery agent captures the L3 path. The
architecture of the path discovery agent is shown in Figure 3.2.
3.4.1 ICMP Rate Limiting
Generating ICMP packets in response to traceroute consumes switch CPU, which
is a valuable resource in a data center. In our network, there is a hard cap of
Tmax = 100 on the number of ICMP messages a switch will send per second. We
want to limit the traceroute load on the switches such that the number of ICMP
messages is below Tmax. To do so, we first checked the hop count of all host’s TCP
connections during a one hour period in one of our production data centers to see
how many connections might go through a T3 switch. We observed that 97.9% of
these connections had a hop count less than or equal to 5 and did not go through
a T3 switch. Given that our network is a Clos topology and assuming that hosts
under a top of the rack switch (ToR) communicate with hosts under a different ToR
uniformly at random, we show:
Theorem 1. The rate of ICMP packets generated by any switch due to a traceroute is
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below Tmax if the rate Ct at which hosts trigger traceroutes is upper bounded as
Ct ≤ n1n2Tmax
H max
[
n2,
n20(npod−1)
n0npod−1
] , (3.1)
where n0, n1, and n2 are the numbers of ToR, T1, and T2 switches respectively and H is the
number of hosts under each ToR.
Proof. See appendix.
For example, the upper bound of Ct in one of our data centers is 10. This means
that as long as hosts do not open more than 10 connections per second, we can
guarantee that the number of traceroutes generated by Vigil will not go above Tmax.
We use the hard threshold Ct obtained in the above calculation to limit the number
of traceroutes allowed on each host to prevent overwhelming the switches. The
agent triggers path discovery no more than once every epoch for a given connection
to further limit the number of traceroutes. We use epochs of 30 seconds. We will
show in §3.5 that this number is sufficient to ensure high accuracies in detecting
links dropping packets in the network.
3.4.2 Engineering Challenges
Using the correct five-tuple: Like most modern data centers, our network also
makes extensive use of ECMP. All packets of a given flow, defined by the so-called
five-tuple, follow the same path [68]. Thus, the traceroute packets must have the
same five-tuple as the TCP connection we are attempting to trace. To ensure this,
we must account for the use of load balancers.
TCP connections are initiated in our data center in a manner similar to that
described in [110]. The connection is first established to a virtual IP (VIP) and the
SYN packet (containing the VIP as destination) goes to a software load balancer
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(SLB) which assigns that connection to a physical destination IP (DIP) and a service
port associated with that VIP. The SLB then sends a configuration message to the
virtual switch (vSwitch) in the hypervisor of the source machine that registers that
DIP with that vSwitch. The destination of all subsequent packets in that connection
have the DIP as their destination and do not go through the SLB. In order for the
path of the traceroute packets to match that of the data packets, its header should
contain the DIP and not the VIP. Thus, before tracing the path of a connection, the
path discovery module first queries the SLB for the VIP-to-DIP mapping for that
connection and uses the DIP as the destination address for the traceroute packets.
Note that there are cases where the TCP connection establishment itself may fail
due to packet loss. Path discovery is not triggered for such connections. It is also
not triggered when the query to SLB fails to avoid tracerouting the internet.
Re-routing and packet drops: We must consider the possibility that the traceroute
itself may fail. For example, this may happen if the link drop rate is very high. This
actually helps us, since it directly pinpoints the faulty link. Our analysis engine,
described in the next section, is able to use such partial traceroutes.
A more insidious possibility is that the routing may change by the time tracer-
oute starts. We use BGP in our data center network. A lossy link may cause one or
more BGP sessions to fail, triggering rerouting. Then, the traceroute packets may
take a different path than the original connection.
The design of VigilVigil helps avoids this problem. The RTTs in a data cen-
ter are typically less than 1 or 2 milliseconds, so the TCP sender retransmits a
dropped packet quickly. The ETW framework notifies the TCP monitoring agent
immediately, which invokes the path monitoring agent. The only additional delay
is the time required to query the SLB to obtain the VIP-to-DIP mapping, which is
typically less than a millisecond. Thus, as long as paths are stable for a few mil-
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liseconds after a packet drop, the traceroute packets will follow the same path as
the TCP connection.
Our network also makes extensive use of link aggregation (LAG) [75]. How-
ever, unless all the links in the aggregation group fail, the L3 path is not affected.
Router aliasing We note that the problem of router aliasing [64] is easily solved in
a data center, as we know the topology, names, and IP addresses of all routers and
interfaces. We simply map the IP’s from traceroutes to the switch names (which
we have from the topology).
To summarize, Vigil’s implementation is as follows: Once the TCP monitoring
agent notifies the path discovery agent that a connection has suffered a retransmis-
sion, the path discovery agent checks its cache of discovered path for that epoch
and if need be, queries the SLB for the DIP. It then sends 15 appropriately crafted
TCP packets with TTL values ranging from 0 − 15. In order to disambiguate the
responses, the TTL value is also encoded in the IP ID field [3]. This allows for con-
current traceroutes to multiple destinations. The TCP packets deliberately carry a
bad checksum to ensure that they do not interfere with the ongoing connection.
3.5 The Analysis Agent
Next we describe the analysis agent, focusing first on its voting-based scheme,
before presenting an analytical optimal solution that is NP-hard for comparison.
3.5.1 Voting Based Scheme
Vigil’s analysis agent operates based on a simple voting scheme. If a connection
sees a retransmission, Vigil votes the links of that connection to be bad. Each vote
carries a value that is tallied at the end of each epoch, giving a natural ranking of
each link in the network. We set the value of good votes to 0 (if a connection has no
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retransmission, no traceroute needs to be issued). Bad votes are assigned a value
of 1
h
, where h is the number of hops on the path since every link on the path is
equally likely to be responsible for the drop.
The ranking obtained by Vigil after tallying the votes allows us to identify the
most likely cause of packet drops on each connection by comparing their ranking
(which are higher for links with higher drop rates). To further guard against high
levels of noise, we can use our knowledge of the topology. Namely, when finding
the rankings, the votes of the links lower in the list can be adjusted (assuming
ECMP distributes connections uniformly at random) using an approximation of
the number of votes due to the links higher up in the list. We saw in our evaluations
that this can result in a 5% reduction in the number of false positives.
Note, that Vigil can also be used to find the most problematic links in the net-
work at each point in time. This can be done using Algorithm 1. The algorithm
first sorts the links based on their votes. It then checks whether the top voted link’s
votes are higher than 1% of the total votes cast. If not, it stops. If yes, it marks it
as one of the most problematic links, removes it from the set of links, and adjusts
the votes of the remaining links as described earlier. It continues to iterate in this
manner until the stop criterion is met.
3.5.2 Voting Scheme Analysis
Can Vigil deliver on its promise of finding the most probable cause of packet drops
on each TCP connection? In Vigil’s voting scheme failed connections contribute to
increases in the tally of both good and bad links. Moreover, in a large data center
such as ours, occasional, lone, and sporadic packet drops can and will happen
due to good links (links that have very low drop rates). These failures are akin
to “noise” and can cause severe inaccuracies in any detection system [99], Vigil
included. Thus, the answer to this question is not obvious. We show that the
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Algorithm 1 Finding the most problematic links in the network.
1: L ← Set of all links
2: P ← Set of all possible path
3: v(li)← Number of votes for li ∈ L
4: B ← Set of most problematic links
5: lmax ← Link with the maximum votes out of ∀li ∈ L ∩ Bc
6: while v(lmax) ≥ 0.01(
∑
li∈L v(li)) do
7: lmax ← maxli∈L∩Bc v(li)
8: B ← B ∪ {lmax}
9: for li ∈ L ∩ Bc do
10: if ∃ pi ∈ P s.t. li ∈ pi & lmax ∈ pi then
11: Adjust the score of li
12: end if
13: end for
14: end while
15: return B
likelihood of Vigil making these errors is small. Taking advantage of the fact that
we know our topology (Clos network):
Theorem 2. For npod ≥ n0n1 + 1, Vigil will rank with probability 1 − 2e−O(N) the k <
n2(n0npod−1)
n0(npod−1) bad links that drop packets with probability pb higher than all good links that
drop packets with probability pg if
pg ≤ 1− (1− pb)
cl
αcu
where N is the total number of connections between hosts, cl and cu are lower and upper
bounds, respectively, on the number of packets per connection, and
α =
n0(4n0 − k)(npod − 1)
n2(n0npod − 1)− n0(npod − 1)k . (3.2)
Proof. See appendix.
A single connection is unlikely to go through more than one “failed” link in
a network with thousands of links. Theorem 7 ensures that the tally of votes on
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links with higher drop rates is larger than that of good links. Combining these
two observations allows Vigil to find the most likely cause of packet drops on each
connection.
Note that a straightforward corollary of Theorem 7 is that in the absence of
noise (pg = 0), Vigil can pinpoint all bad links with high probability for large
enough N . In the presence of noise, Vigil can still identify the bad links, as long
as the probability of dropping packets on non-failed links is low enough (i.e., the
signal-to-noise ratio is large enough). This number, however, is compatible with
typical values found in practice. Indeed, take as an example cl and cu to be the
10th and 90th percentiles, respectively, of the number of packets sent by TCP con-
nections across all our hosts in a 3 hour period. If pb ≥ 0.5%, the packet drop rate
on good links can be up to 1.8 × 10−6. For pb ≥ 0.05%, then Theorem 7 only re-
quires pg ≤ 7.7× 10−7. Note that packet drop rates in a production data center are
typically below 10−8 [146].
Another important consequence of Theorem 7 is that it establishes that the
probability of errors in Vigil’s results diminishes exponentially with N , so that
even with the limits imposed by Theorem 3.1 we do not need to use epochs longer
than 30s. Moreover, it is worth noting that the conditions in Theorem 7 are suffi-
cient but not necessary. In fact, §3.6 illustrates how well Vigil performs even when
the conditions in Theorem 7 do not hold (e.g., for a larger number of failed links).
3.5.3 Optimal Solution
While Vigil’s voting scheme works with high probability in a set of situations (those
considered in Section 3.5.2), it is not guaranteed to work in all situations. In this
section, we illustrate an alternative solution in the form of an optimization prob-
lem. Given enough resources and time, this method can find the set of links drop-
ping packets on any given connection with high fidelity. The issue is that finding a
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solution to this optimization problem is NP-hard in general [22]. We compare Vigil
to this benchmark in our evaluations.
Our goal is to find the most likely cause of failures. This results in the following
optimization problem:
minimize ‖p‖0
subject to Ap ≥ s
‖p‖1 = ‖s‖1
pi ∈ N ∪ {0}
(3.3)
whereN is the set of natural numbers,A is aC×L routing matrix, s is aC×1 vector
that collects the number of retransmissions suffered by each connection during an
epoch, L is the number of links in the network, C is the number of connections in
an epoch, and ‖y‖0 denotes the cardinality of the support of y. Note that the i-th
element of p estimates how many retransmissions were caused by link i, so that it
can be used to rank the network links.
The formulation assumes that the minimum subset of links that explain all
packet drops is close to representing the set of links dropping packets in real-
ity (this can be shown to be equivalent to a maximum likelihood formulation).
Formulating the problem as 3.3 allows us to relax the stringent Ap = s constraint
employed in tomography, which allows for finding the most probable cause of
failure. A different binary optimization formulation which only marks the links
as good/bad is also possible. In fact, it is the optimization problem that [48, 80]
approximate. Namely,
minimize ‖p‖0
subject to Ap ≥ s
pi ∈ {0, 1}
(3.4)
Similarly to (3.3), this minimum set cover formulation is not tractable (it is NP-
complete [22]). Moreover, it does not provide a ranking of the links and does not
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perform well in the presence of noise. Our evaluations showed that Vigil (Algo-
rithm 1) significantly outperformed this binary optimization (by more than 50% in
the presence of noise). We illustrate this point in Figures 3.4 and 3.9, but otherwise
omit results for this optimization in §3.6 for clarity.
In the next three sections, we present our evaluation of Vigil in simulations §3.6,
in a test cluster §3.7, and in one of our production data centers §3.8.
3.6 Evaluations: Simulations
We start by evaluating in simulations where we know the ground truth. In these
simulations, Vigil finds connections whose drops were due to noise and marks
them as “noise drops”. It then finds the link most likely responsible for packet
drops on the remaining set of connections (“failure drops”). A noisy drop is de-
fined as one where the link responsible for the drop only dropped a single packet.
We found that Vigil never marked a connection into the noisy category incorrectly.
We therefore focus on the accuracy for connections that Vigil puts into the failure
drop class.
Performance metrics. Our primary measure for performance for Vigil is detection
accuracy, which is defined as the likelihood of being able to correctly identify the
cause of a failed connection (e.g., pinpoint the correct link that failed). For simplic-
ity, we refer to this only as accuracy in this section. For evaluating Algorithm 1, we
use the alternative performance metrics of recall and precision. Recall is a measure
of reliability and shows how many of the failures Vigil can accurately detect (false
negatives). For example, if there are 100 failed links and Vigil detects 90 of them, its
recall is 90%. Precision is a measure of accuracy and shows to what extent Vigil’s
results can be trusted (false positives). For example, if Vigil flags 100 links as bad,
but only 90 of those links actually failed, its precision is 90%.
Simulation setup. We use a flow level simulator implemented in MATLAB. Our
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simulated topology consists of 4160 links, 2 pods, 20 ToRs per pod. Each host in
the simulator establishes 2 connections per second to a random ToR in the network
outside of its rack. The simulator has two types of links. For good links that are
operating without failure, packets are dropped at a very low rate chosen uniformly
from (0, 10−6) to simulate noise. On the other hand, failed links have a much higher
drop rate to simulate failures. By default, drop rates on failed links are set to vary
uniformly from 0.01% to 0.1%, though to study the impact of drop rates, we do
allow this rate to vary as an input parameter. The number of good and failed links
is also a tunable simulation parameter. Every 30 seconds of simulation time, we
send up to 100 packets per connection, and drop packets based on the rates above
as they traverse links along the connection. The simulator records all connections
with at least one packet drop, for each such connection, the link with the most
drops.
As a basis for comparison, we compare Vigil against the optimal solution de-
scribed in in §3.5.3. We refer to the optimal solution as “Integer Optimization” in
the figures, and “optimization” in the text when comparing with Vigil.
3.6.1 In the optimal case
In our first experiment, we use simulation settings where the bounds in Theorem 7
do hold. Recall that these bounds are sufficient conditions for Vigil’s accuracy.
The first experiment aims to validate that Vigil can trivially achieve high levels of
accuracy as expected. Given the simulation setup above, we set the drop rates on
the failed links to be between (0.05%, 1%). At drop rates below 0.05%, the theorem
bounds will no longer hold.
Accuracy. Figure 3.3 shows that Vigil has an average accuracy that is higher than
96% in almost all cases. Furthermore, due to its robustness to noise, it also outper-
forms the optimization algorithm (§ 3.5.3) in most cases.
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Figure 3.3: When Theorem 2 holds.
Recall and precision. Figure 3.4 shows that even with low packet drop rates on
the failed links, Vigil detects the failed links with high recall and precision. This
confirms that when the conditions in Theorem 7 hold, Vigil can be trusted to find
the right set of links.
In the rest of this section, we proceed to evaluate Vigil’s performance when the
conditions in Theorem 7 do not hold (i.e. packet drop rates below 0.05%). This
illustrates that while sufficient, these conditions are not necessary for the good
performance of Vigil.
3.6.2 Varying Drop Rates
Our next experiment aims to push the boundaries of Theorem 7 by varying the
“failed” links drop rates well below the conservative bounds of Theorem 7.
Single Failure. Figure 3.5a shows simulation results for different drop rates on a
single failed link in the network. Our results show that for high drop rates, Vigil
can find the cause of packet drops on each connection with high accuracy. Even
as the drop rate decreases below the 0.05% bound obtained from Theorem 7, we
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Figure 3.4: Testing Algorithm 1 when Theorem 2 holds.
observe that Vigil is still able to maintain a high level of accuracy (≥ 80%), on par
with the optimal solution.
Multiple Failures. A noted shortcoming of past work has been in identifying
problematic links in the network where the failed links have very different drop
rates [119]. We test Vigil’s ability to find the cause of packet drops in the presence
of such failures. Figure 3.5b illustrates this point for different number of failed
links under the default drop rate setting described in the simulation setup. Vigil is
almost always successful at identifying the link responsible for a packet drop. In
fact, it surpasses the optimization algorithm (albeit slightly) in §3.5.3. This is due to
the optimization’s susceptibility to lone packet drops due to noise.
3.6.3 Impact of Noise
Single Failure. We next vary the level of noise in the network to see how well
Vigil can attribute the cause of packet drops in the presence of various degrees of
noise. This is done by changing the drop rate of the good links across different ex-
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Figure 3.5: Vigil’s accuracy for varying drop rates.
perimental runs. Figure 3.6a shows the accuracy results in the case of a single link
failure as the drop rate varies. Higher noise levels could make it harder for Vigil
to detect the link failure through Algorithm 1. However, as shown in Figure 3.6
they have little impact on its ability to find the cause of packet drops on individual
connections.
Multiple Failures. We repeat this experiment for the case of 5 failed links. Fig-
ure 3.6b shows the results. Again, Vigil shows little sensitivity to the increase in
noise when identifying the cause of per-connection packet drops. Note that the
large confidence intervals of the integer optimization problem show its high sensi-
tivity to noise.
3.6.4 Varying Number of Connections
In previous experiments, all hosts opened 2 connections per second. Here, we
allow hosts to choose the number of connections they create in each epoch uni-
formly at random between (10, 60). Recall from Theorem 7 that a larger number of
connections from each host helps Vigil improve its accuracy.
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Figure 3.6: Vigil’s accuracy for varying noise levels. Lone/sporadic drops are
not of interest to a network provider/operator. Vigil can successfully ignore such
drops and continue to perform well in the presence of high degrees of noise.
Single Failure. Figure 3.7a validates this effect for the case of a single filed link.
Our results show that Vigil accurately identify the cause of packet drops on con-
nections with high probability. Vigil also significantly outperform the optimization
when the failed link has a low packet drop rate. This is because the optimization
has multiple optimal points and is not sufficiently constrained.
Multiple Failures. Figure 3.7b repeats the same experiment as above, but we vary
the number of failed links under the default drop rate settings. The integer opti-
mization problem suffers from the lack of information to constrain the set of re-
sults. It therefore has a huge variance (shown in terms of confidence intervals).
Vigil on the other hand maintains high probability of detection (at low variance)
no matter the number of failed links.
3.6.5 Impact of Traffic Skews
Single Failure. We next demonstrate Vigil’s ability to detect the cause of connec-
tion packet drops even when traffic is heavily skewed. We pick 10 ToRs at random
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Figure 3.7: Vigil’s accuracy for varying number of connections. Each host opens
between (10, 60) connections. Where the number is chosen unifromly at random.
from the set of all ToRs in the network (25% of the ToRs). To skew the traffic, 80% of
the connections have destinations set to hosts under these 10 ToRs, an the remain-
ing connections route to hosts randomly chosen in the network. Figure 3.8a shows
that despite the traffic skews, the optimization is much more heavily impacted by
the skew than Vigil. Vigil continues to detect the cause of packet drops with high
probability (≥ 85%) for drop rates higher than 0.1%.
Multiple Failures. We repeated the above experiment for multiple failures. Fig-
ure 3.8b shows that the optimization’s accuracy suffers. It consistently shows a
low detection rate as its constraints are not sufficient in guiding the optimizer to
the right solution. On the other hand ,Vigil maintains a detection rate of ≥ 98% at
all times.
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intervals of the optimization problem are a reflection of its sensitivity to noise.
3.6.6 Detecting Bad Links
In all our previous experiments, the focus has been on detection accuracy from
each connection’s point of view. In our next experiment, we evaluate Vigil’s ability
to detect bad links using the metrics of recall and precision.
Single Failure. Figure 3.9 shows the results for finding the failed link in the net-
work using Algorithm 1. In the presence of a single failure, our approach out-
performs the optimization algorithm as it does not require a fully specified set of
equations in order to provide a best guess as to which link is failed.
Multiple Failures. In this scenario, the drop rates on the failed links are heav-
ily skewed. More specifically, at least one failed link is assigned a drop rate in
the range of (10%, 100%) while all others have a drop rate in (0.01%, 0.1%). This
scenario is one where past approaches have reported as potentially hard to de-
tect [119]. Figure 3.10 shows that Vigil can detect up to 7 failures with recall/pre-
cision above 90%. However, its recall drops as the number of failed links increase.
This is due to the fact that the increase in the number of failures drives up the votes
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of all other links increasing the cutoff threshold and therefore increasing the likeli-
hood of false negatives. In fact if instead the top k links had been selected Vigil’s
recall would have been close to 100% [1]. Further evaluations can be found in [1].
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Figure 3.9: Algorithm 1 with single failure. Vigil can accurately detect the cause
of problems with recall/precision above 90%. However, its recall drops as the
number of failed links increase.
3.6.7 Effects of Network size
In our final experiment, we explore how Vigil performs as the network size grows.
We observe that its accuracy was on average 98% when the network consisted of
1 pod, 92% for 2 pods, 91% for 3 pods, and 90% for 4 pods when finding a single
link failure. In contrast, the optimization problem (3.3) had an average accuracy
of 94%, 72%, 79%, and 77% for the respective number of pods.
We further evaluate both Vigil and the optimization’s ability to find the cause of
per connection drops when the number of failed links in the network was≥ 30. We
observe that both approach’s performance remained unchanged for the most part,
e.g., the accuracy of Vigil in identifying drop causes in an example with 30 failed
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Figure 3.10: Algorithm 1 with multiple failures. The drop rates on the links are
heavily skewed. Prior work have noted the difficulty of detecting links with
high drop rates in such scenarios. Vigil, however, continues to exhibit high pre-
cision/recall.
links is 98.01%. Figure 3.11 shows the performance (recall) of using Algorithm 1
as the pod sizes vary. We observe that recall stayed high even as the network
increases in size. The precision was always 100% and we omit the graph for brevity.
3.7 Evaluations: Test Cluster
We next evaluate Vigil on the more realistic environment of a test cluster consisting
of 10 ToRs with a total of 80 links. We only control 50 hosts in the cluster, while
others are production machines. Therefore, the T1 switches see real production
traffic. We recorded 6 hours of TCP traffic from a host in production and replayed
that traffic from our hosts in the cluster (with different starting times varying by 1-2
minutes). Using Everflow-like functionality [145] on the ToR switches, we induced
different rates of packet drops on T1 to ToR links. Our goal is to identify the cause
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Figure 3.11: Recall of Algorithm 1 for different numbers of pods. A six pod net-
work consists of 12480 links. In all cases Vigil continues to have Recall higher than
90%. Note, that its precision is 100% for all cases.
of packet drops on each TCP connection §3.7.2 and to validate whether Algorithm
1 works in practice §3.7.3.
3.7.1 Clean Testbed Validation
We first validate a clean testbed environment. We repave the cluster by setting all
hosts and ToR switches to a clean state. We then run Vigil without injecting any
failures. We observe that in the newly-repaved cluster, links arriving at a particular
ToR switch had abnormally high votes, namely 22.5 ± 3.65 in average. We thus
suspected that this ToR is experiencing problems. After rebooting it, the total votes
of the links went down to 0, validating our suspicions. We then proceed with our
controlled experiments.
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3.7.2 Per-connection Link Failure Analysis
We aim to quantify the accuracy of Vigil in identifying the cause of packet drops
when links have very different drop rates. We induce a drop rate of 0.2% and 0.05%
on two different links in the network over an hour period. Since we do not know
the ground truth when the connection path does not go through either of the two
links, we only consider connections that go through at least one of the two failed
links. In 90.47% of the connections seen in a one hour period, Vigil was able to
attribute the packet drop to the correct link (the one with higher drop rate).
3.7.3 Identifying Failed Links
We next validate Vigil’s ability to correctly identify a failed link in the presence
of a single failure. We inject different packet drop rates on a chosen failed link
and seek to determine whether there is a correlation between total votes and drop
rates. Specifically, we look at the difference between the vote tally on the bad link
and that of the most voted good link. We induced a packet drop rate of 1%, 0.1%,
and 0.05% on a T1 to ToR link in the test cluster.
Figure 3.12 illustrates the distribution for the various drop rates on the bad link.
As the figure indicates, the failed link has the highest vote out of all links when the
drop rate is 1% and 0.1%. When the drop rate is lowered to 0.05%, the failed link
becomes harder to detect due to the smaller gap between the drop rate of the bad
link and that of the normal links. Indeed, the bad link only has the maximum score
in 88.89% of the instances (mostly due to occasional lone drops on healthy links).
Nevertheless, it is always one of the 2 links with the highest vote.
Figure 3.12 also shows the high correlation between the probability of packet
drop on a links and its vote tally. Note that this trivially shows that Vigil is 100%
accurate in identifying the cause of packet drops on each connection given a single
link failure: the failed link has the highest votes among all links. We compare Vigil
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with the integer optimization problem in (3.3). We find that the latter also returns
the correct result every time, albeit at the cost of a large number of false positives.
To illustrate this point: the number of links marked as bad by (3.3) is 1.54 ± 0.09,
1.18 ± 0.04, and 1.47 ± 0.13 times higher than the number given by Vigil for the
drop rates of 1%, 0.1%, and 0.05% respectively (averaged across each 30-seconds
epoch in a one hour period).
Finally, we investigate Vigil’s ability to identify multiple link failures. This is
a harder experiment to configure due to the smaller number of links in this test
cluster and hence lower path diversity. We induce different drop rates (p1 = 0.2%
and p2 = 0.1%) on two links in the test cluster. We note that the link with higher
drop rate is the most voted 100% of the time. The second link, however, is the sec-
ond highest ranked 47% of the time and the third 32% of the time. Still, it always
remained in the top 5 links. This shows that by allowing a single false positive (in
this case, identifying three instead of two links), Vigil can detect all failed links 80%
of the time even in a setup where the traffic distribution is skewed. This is some-
thing past approaches [119] could not achieve. Note that in this example, Vigil
identifies the true cause of packet drops on each connection 98% of the time.
3.8 Evaluations: Production
We have deployed Vigil in one of our production data centers. In this section, we
share some of our observations from this deployment. We note that the number of
traceroutes generated by Vigil never exceeded Tmax during its one month deploy-
ment in production.
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Figure 3.12: Distribution of the difference between votes on bad links and the max-
imum vote on good links for different bad link drop rates. The numbers clearly
show a large correlation between the drop rates induced and the votes on the link
dropping packets.
3.8.1 Comparison to EverFlow
Knowing the true nature of failures in a production data center is hard. Therefore,
we perform a semi-controlled experiment in one of our production data centers
to test the efficacy of Vigil. The cluster consists of thousands of hosts/links. This
provides evidence that Vigil works well in practice. To find the “ground truth”, we
compare its results to that obtained by an EverFlow-like system, hereby referred to
as EverFlow, deployed in our production data center (this system is not deployed
in our test cluster and could not be used in that setting). EverFlow captures all
packets going through each switch on which it was enabled. Therefore, it is ex-
pensive to run for extended periods of time. We thus only run EverFlow for a
period of 30 minutes and configure it to capture all outgoing IP traffic from two
random hosts in the cluster. Furthermore, we specifically capture connections to
our storage service. We filter all connections that were detected to have at least
one retransmission during this time. We also tracked their packets and find where
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any where dropped (using EverFlow). We then check whether the detected link
matches that found by Vigil. We found that Vigil was accurate in every single case.
3.8.2 Finding The Cause of VM Reboots
During our deployment, there were 278 VM reboots in the cluster for which there
was no explanation. Vigil identified a link as the cause of problems in each of
these instances. In 261 cases, there was high drop rates on the host to ToR link.
In another 15, the endpoints of the identified links were undergoing configuration
updates. In the remaining 2 instances, the link was flapping.
3.9 Discussion
A number of novel innovations are enabled by Vigil. As an example, using Vigil,
the host can determine a healthy DIP pool to use at each point in time. This is be-
cause due to encapsulation, the path of each connection is completely determined
by the DIP. Thus, Vigil can potentially help avoid unhealthy path. Vigil is de-
ployed in our production data center. A number of additional factors to consider
when using Vigil include:
Source NATs. Source network address translators (SNATs) change the source IP of
a packet before it is sent out to the network to a VIP. The ICMP messages will have
to carry the right source address for Vigil to get the response to its traceroutes. This
can be enabled through a query to SLB. Details are omitted.
ACK Loss on reverse path. In rare cases, it is possible that the packet loss on the
reverse path is so severe that loss of ACK packets trigger timeout at the sender.
If this happens, the traceroute would not be going over any link that triggered
the packet drop. Since TCP ACKs are cumulative, this is typically not a problem
unless loss rates are very high. Spurious retransmissions triggered by timeouts
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may also occur if there is sudden increase delay on forward or reverse paths. This
can happen due to a variety of reasons including rerouting, or large queue buildup.
Currently, we treat these retransmissions like any other.
Vigil’s dependency on network topology. The calculations in §3.5 take advantage
of the fact that our network topology is known and is similar to a Clos network.
However, the same calculations can be repeated for any known topology. The ac-
curacy of Vigil is heavily tied to the degree of path diversity in the network and
that multiple path are available at each hop: the higher the degree of path diver-
sity, the better Vigil performs. This is also a desired property in any data center
topology [113].
Header specific drops. Vigil may result in a large number of false positives when
a packet drops are header specific, either due to policy misconfigurations or hard-
ware bugs. In this case, packets may be dropped for one connection, while other
connections along the same path are unharmed. Vigil can only narrow down the
cause of these drops to all the links along the path without being able to localize
the device itself. Such problems are rare, Vigil still provides useful information to
the operator in narrowing down the set of devices to be investigated.
Vigil’s ranking. Vigil’s ranking approach will naturally bias towards the detection
of failed links that are frequently used. This is an intentional design choice as the
goal of Vigil is to identity high impact failures that affect many connections.
Finding the path of all connection. One may think that if one knew the topology,
and the details of the ECMP functions on all the routers, the path of a packet can be
identified by simply inspecting its header. However, ECMP functions are typically
proprietary and also have initialization “seeds” that change with every reboot of
the switch. More importantly, ECMP functions change in the face of link failures
and recoveries. Keeping track of all link failures/recoveries in real time is not
feasible at data center scale.
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Diagnosing VM traffic problems. Vigil’s current goal is to find the cause of packet
drops on infrastructure connections (and through those find the failed links in the
network). In principle, we can build a Vigil-like system to diagnose TCP failures
for connections established by customer VM’s as well. However, a number of prob-
lems need to be solved to build such a system. Including security and scalability
issues. This is part of our future work.
3.10 Conclusion
In this chapter we presented Vigil, an always on and scalable monitoring/diagno-
sis system for data center networks that is completely contained within the end
hosts. Vigil can accurately identify drop rates as low as 0.05% in data centers with
thousands of links through monitoring the status of ongoing TCP connections and
“informed path discovery”. It provides a ranking of links that allows for find-
ing the most likely cause of packet drops on each individual TCP connection. We
demonstrate mathematically, in simulations, and empirically in a production envi-
ronment that Vigil continues to provide high accuracy (recall and precision) in the
presence of noise. This is achieved while rate limiting path discovery messages to
stay within production limits.
Both NetPoirot and Vigil allow end hosts to assist operators in the diagnosis
process. However, such diagnosis (as well as recovery) takes time. It is important
to maintain high QoS while recovery is in progress. In the following chapters we
will investigate the efficacy of multipath approaches in allowing clients to circum-
vent failures if/when possible in various settings.
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Chapter 4
Resilience to Failures at the
Endpoints Through Multipath TCP
Our work in Chapters 2 and 3 aims to enables clients to assist in identifying the
cause of failures when they occur. However, failures are disruptive and it’s desir-
able to shield users from their impact. With the increasing number of users, pro-
viding performance guarantees to these users is becoming increasingly difficult.
Similar reasons to those described in earlier chapters (lack of cooperation between
the various organizations as well as high reaction times) reduce the effectiveness
of distributed solutions to this problem. Thus, additional algorithms/protocols at
the endpoints can help further improve client’s resilience to such problems.
Multipath solutions are one such solution, as it is unlikely that all path should
fail simultaneously. They have been extensively studied in the past e.g., [9, 105] in
the context of datacenters and the Internet. For example, Multipath TCP (MPTCP) [105]
has allowed end users to leverage multiple path at the transport layer in order to
connect through multiple parallel paths. The protocol is designed to move traf-
fic away from congested paths onto less congested ones using its joint congestion
control algorithm [78]. Significant progress has been made in understanding the
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protocols behavior in terms of fairness, stability, etc. However, a complete un-
derstanding of the protocol, its performance, and especially the implications of
MPTCPs joint congestion control algorithm on other modules in the protocol is
lacking. In our work in [14], we observed various interesting (and in some cases
unintuitive) behaviors by the protocol. Such behaviors show that a complete un-
derstanding of multipath protocols is still lacking. In this work we focus mainly
on investigating such behavior in wide area networks, as most are fundamental to
the protocol itself (irrespective of the setting in which it is used). Extending these
investigations to the context of datacenter networks is the subject of future work.
4.1 The Shortcomings of MultiPath TCP
4.1.1 Motivation
Multipath TCP (MPTCP) [116] is an emerging protocol that enables transmissions
over multiple paths, overcoming potential single path capacity limitations. These
benefits are fueling a growing adoption with, for example, Apple iOS 7 now sup-
porting MPTCP. The protocol is complex with many interacting parameters, and
has been the focus of numerous empirical [107, 116, 13] and analytical [112, 135]
studies. A complete understanding of the interactions of its many parameters,
and in particular those associated with its complex congestion control algorithm,
is lacking.
We make the following contributions:
Empirical evaluation. the Mininet [95] emulator, we study the impact of the choice
of initial path in establishing an MPTCP connection. We uncover some surprising
outcomes – that the choice of the initial path can not just have a lasting impact on
MPTCP performance, but that in some cases, starting with an inferior path (with
higher RTT) can improve overall throughput.
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Analytical model. We develop a stylized analytical model to investigate this be-
havior based on the partitioning of MPTCP’s congestion control into two distinct
phases. Using this model and numerical analyses, we elucidate and validate em-
pirical observations, and identify the non-linear coupling between paths intro-
duced by MPTCP’s congestion control as a major contributor.
4.1.2 Background and Related Work
MPTCP extends TCP with the ability to transmit on multiple paths. For backward
compatibility purposes, MPTCP presents applications a TCP-like socket abstrac-
tion. The protocol then establishes and maintains multiple subflows, one on each
path. A representative implementation of MPTCP [116] incorporates an API to add
and remove paths from the set of available selections. The MPTCP layer handles
out-of-order packet arrivals and congestion control across sub-flows. MPTCP’s
congestion control algorithm was designed with the following objectives: (1) Per-
form at least as well as a single TCP session on the best path; (2) Be fair to other
TCP flows; and (3) Move traffic away from congested paths to less congested ones
when possible.
To satisfy these goals, MPTCP performs joint congestion control over its multi-
ple paths, which operates exactly as TCP would when in slow start or fast retrans-
mit. However, MPTCP couples tuning of the congestion windows of each sub-flow
during congestion avoidance.
A significant body of work has been devoted to characterizing and optimiz-
ing MPTCP’s coupled congestion control. The authors of [112] perform a theo-
retical analysis of the problem, characterizing factors governing responsiveness,
TCP-friendliness, and window oscillations of a joint congestion control method for
MPTCP. Other works [123, 78, 135] focus on improving MPTCP’s joint congestion
control.
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4.1.3 Empirical Evaluation
MPTCP’s throughput is highly dependent on its ability to appropriately schedule
transmissions across paths [13]. The scheme used in the current implementation
of MPTCP favors lower RTT paths, since this in turns reduces the receive buffer
size (lowering the memory footprint at the receiver). However, a comprehensive
understanding of the interactions between this selection and congestion control is
still lacking. To gain an initial understanding, we perform an empirical evaluation
using an open-source MPTCP implementation [116] over the Mininet [95] emu-
lator on a Ubuntu (version 3.11) OS. These experiments as well as our analysis,
rely on the Linked Increase Algorithm (LIA) [135] as the coupled congestion control
algorithms, but the results should apply to other schemes.
Experiment Setup
Figure 4.1: Mininet topology.
Figure 4.1 shows the simple topology used in our experiments. It consists of
a source S and destination D. S is dual-homed (connected to routers R1 and R2).
The link R3/D is added so that D is single-homed. Consequently, there are only
two candidate subflows S → R1 → R3 → D and S → R2 → R3 → D. Since the
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main purpose of the R3/D link is to make D single-homed, its propagation delay
is set to 0. All other links have the same propagation delay and are assumed to be
lossless.
In the rest of the paper, C1 and C2 denote the capacity of the first and second
subflows respectively. We vary C1 and C2 during the experiments, and set the
capacity between R3 and D to be high enough (100Mbps) to avoid it becoming
the bottleneck. Each experiment runs for at least 200 seconds to allow MPTCP to
reach steady state. The iperf tool is used to measure throughput, which we define
as the total number of bytes (MB) transmitted successfully for each experiment’s
duration. To avoid interference across experiments, we turn off TCP route caching
in Linux.
4.1.4 Impact of Path RTT on Throughput
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Figure 4.2: MPTCP throughput (MB) as path RTT difference increases.
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Figure 4.3: MPTCP throughput (MB) as path RTT difference increases.
Across experiments, the RTT of each subflow varies as follows. We fix τ1, which
is the RTT of subflow S → R1 → R3 → D. The RTT of subflow 2, τ2, is varied and
always set to be larger than τ1, with the difference denoted as δ. In all experiments,
we set C1 and C2 to be 10Mbps, τ1 to be 200ms, and vary δ from 10ms to 200ms.
For each experiment, either the path with lower RTT τ1 (Path 1) starts first, or
the higher RTT path (Path 2) does. This is achieved by configuring the routing
tables and deactivating the interface on the later path for the duration of the start
time-lag. Note that no matter which path starts first, MPTCP’s built in scheduler
prioritizes the lower RTT path. Figures 4.2-4.3 summarize the MPTCP throughput
(MB) as δ increases, across two sets of experiments. Each experiment is carried
out over 15 runs, and we present average throughput results with 95% confidence
interval bars to account for variations in CPU load.
Figure 4.2 corresponds to a scenario where both paths start immediately one
after the other. Irrespective of which path is selected to start first, the lag between
their respective establishment depends solely on the RTT of the second path, as it
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affects the duration of the three-way TCP handshake. The figure shows that when
the lower RTT path is selected first (solid blue line labeled as Path 1 First), MPTCP’s
throughput is higher than under the Path 2 First scenario (dotted red line). This is
as expected, given the scheduler’s preference for the lower RTT path and its initial
higher throughput.
Figure 4.3 shows our next set of results, where we add a 4 seconds time lag
between the time the initial path is chosen, and when the second path is made
available. This produces a non-intuitive result, namely, that when the longer RTT
path is selected first, MPTCP’s throughput is actually higher for δ values up to
100ms! Beyond δ = 100ms, Path 1 First begins to exhibit higher throughput again.
We observed similar results when increasing the time lag to 6 seconds. Note also
that the overall throughput is higher in this scenario than in the previous one.
4.1.5 MPTCP Model
Our empirical results in Section 4.1.3 suggest that whenever multiple subflows of
different RTT are available, MPTCP throughput will depend on the initial path
being chosen, and sometimes, picking the path with higher RTT as the starting
point results in higher throughput – a non-intuitive observation. In this section,
we present a stylized analytical model of MPTCP, to explain the behavior as a
consequence of MPTCP’s coupled congestion control.
4.1.6 Setting Up The Problem
Our model is based on a generalization of the topology in Figure 4.1, where we
assume two paths 1 and 2, with an arbitrary number of intermediate routers. Each
path, i, is assumed to have a bottleneck capacity Ci. The two paths are disjoint,
and all queues in the network use the Drop-Tail policy.
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In the analysis that follows, the congestion window of path i at time t is de-
noted1 as wi(t), and the transmission rate on that path is represented as xi(t). We
denote the round trip time on path i as τi. Note that τi can be considered as the
sum of the two-way propagation delay on path i and the added queueing delay.
We take both path’s propagation delays to be constant2.
Without loss of generality, we assume that in the absence of queueing delay
τ1 ≤ τ2 or equivalently τ2 = τ1 + δ. Consistent with the Linux kernel implementa-
tion, the ssthresh is zero, which means that the connection begins in congestion
avoidance. Upon reception of each acknowledgment on path i, MPTCP’s conges-
tion window is increased by Ii(ws(t)), where ws(t) = (w1(t), w2(t)).
Based on the LIA coupled congestion algorithm:
Ii(ws(t)) = min
(max(w1(t)
τ21
, w2(t)
τ22
)
(w1
τ1
+ w2
τ2
)2
,
1
wi
)
. (4.1)
We divide the operation of MPTCP subflows into two modes, each of which is
modeled separately in Sections 4.1.8 and 4.1.9, and used to characterize the effect
of MPTCP’s choice of “first” path in initiating the connection.
4.1.7 The Two Modes of an MPTCP Subflow
Depending on congestion window size, each subflow’s congestion control mecha-
nism is divided into two modes.
Mode 1. When MPTCP subflows have a relatively small initial window, each sub-
flow i will start by operating in mode 1. Here, an MPTCP subflow on path i can
transmit up to wi(t) packets before it has to stop and wait for acknowledgments.
The acknowledgment for a packet transmitted at time t over path i arrives at the
1We further assume that the source and destination have sufficient memory available such that
TCP’s congestion window is equal to the sending window and that the send buffer is large enough
so that there is always data available to be sent if the sending window allows it.
2Variations in round trip times are due to variations in queueing delay.
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source at time t + τi. Thus, if a subflow’s congestion window is smaller than the
bandwidth delay product (BDP) of its path i.e., if wi(t) ≤ τiCi, the subflow remains
idle until acknowledgments for the current window transmissions start arriving.
When a subflow is operating in mode 1, it transmits at a rate below that of the
bottleneck link. Thus, all queues along the subflow’s path remain empty.
Mode 2. As the congestion window increases, if wi(t) ≥ τiCi acknowledgments
now arrive periodically, at regular intervals determined by the bottleneck capacity,
Ci, the MPTCP subflow enters mode 2. This means that the subflow can continue
transmission without interruption (until a packet is lost). In mode 2, the subflow
is able to transmit at a rate higher than Ci allowing for the queue at the bottleneck
link to grow. This results eventually in a dropped packet, as well as progressive
increases in the path’s observed round trip time until the packet drop. Note that
depending on wi(t), at time t when the loss occurs, it is possible for the subflow to
then return to mode 1.
4.1.8 Modeling The MPTCP Subflow in Mode 1
In mode 1, the subflow i’s transmission rate is limited by its congestion window,
and xi(t) ' wi(t)τi . This allows us to use the traditional fluid model [77], to model its
behavior.
Subflow i is operating under the condition wi(t) ≤ τiCi. Since the congestion
window is not large enough to use the entire capacity available on path i, upon
transmission of wi(t) packets the subflow waits until acknowledgments arrive be-
fore it can send any more packets. Thus, the MPTCP subflow can be considered as
sending wi(t) packets every τi seconds (xi(t) ' wi(t)τi ). Since the subflow is trans-
mitting at a rate below Ci, queues remain empty and there is no queueing delay.
Thus, following the approach in [112], we can model the change in congestion
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Figure 4.4: The NewReno fast retransmission algorithm. There is no transmission
on the subflow during time block C.
window over a period of τi seconds, which we denote as ∂wi, as follows:
∂wi = Ii(ws)wi =
∂wi
∂t
τi. (4.2)
Using (4.2) and the relation xi(t) ' wi(t)τi we can write
∂xi
∂t
=
xi(t)
τi
Ii(ws), (4.3)
which describes the transmission rate on flow i in mode 1.
This model will not be valid in mode 2, since not only xi(t) 6= wi(t)τi , but also we
can no longer assume that τi is constant. Furthermore, it is possible for an MPTCP
subflow in mode 2 to experience losses due to an overflow of the queue at the
bottleneck link.
4.1.9 Modeling The MPTCP Subflow in Mode 2
When operating in mode 2, the MPTCP subflow has a congestion window that sat-
isfies wi(t) ≥ τiCi. The subflow is no longer able to send wi(t) packets every round
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trip time, since τi is not enough time for all the acknowledgments of the previously
transmitted window to arrive. Thus, the model described in Section 4.1.8 cannot
be used to describe an MPTCP subflow’s behavior in this situation.
The MPTCP subflow is allowed to transmit at a rate progressively higher than
Ci (although acknowledgments are clocked, the continued increase in window size
allows the transmissions of additional packets in each roundtrip). Therefore, the
queue at the bottleneck link grows, eventually resulting in a packet loss as well as
a steady increase in observed round trip time.
We denote the capacity of the queue on path i as Ni and the number of packets
in the queue at time t as li(t). Using this notation, and given that the rate of change
in li(t) is equal to the difference in the queue’s input and output rates
∂li
∂t
= xi(t)1li(t)<Ni − Ci1li(t)>0, (4.4)
where 1x is an indicator function evaluating to 1 when x is TRUE and 0 otherwise,
ensuring that no packets are added to the queue once it reaches its maximum size
and that it is not drained when li(t) = 0. Since propagation delays are constant,
the rate of change in path i’s RTT, τi, can be written as:
∂τi
∂t
=
xi(t)
Ci
1li(t)≤Ni − 1li(t)>0. (4.5)
Given that ACKs arrive periodically with a period Ti = 1Ci in mode 2, we can
assume that changes in wi(t) and xi(t) occur at equally spaced points in time t =
kTi where k ∈ {1, 2, 3 . . . }. Thus, we can use a discrete time system with a step size
of Ti to model the subflow’s behavior and then generalize that model by setting
wi(t) = wi[k] and xi(t) = xi[k] for k satisfying kTi ≤ t < (k + 1)Ti, where [ ] is used
to denote the discrete time counterparts of xi(t) and wi(t).
Therefore, in the absence of losses
x[k] = Ci + Ii(ws)Ci (4.6)
w[k] = w[k − 1] + Ii(ws). (4.7)
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We assume that notifications of losses arrive only due to triple duplicate ACKs,
at which point the subflow enters fast retransmit [67]. At any time t, there are wi(t)
outstanding packets while the subflow is in mode 2. We can use this to describe
the subflow’s behavior during fast retransmit. This is illustrated in Figure 4.4.
The end of block A in Figure 4.4 marks t = nTi where a packet was lost. At that
time wi[n] packets remain unacknowledged on path i. The ACK which arrives3
at the end of block B at t = (n + wi[n])Ti, marks the arrival of the first of the
triple duplicate ACKs. We approximate the arrival of the third duplicate ACK to
be the same. At this time, the congestion window is halved and ssthresh is set
to wi[n+wi[n]]
2
.
At the beginning of block C, the congestion window is set to the reduced value
wi[n+wi[n]]
2
. Given that wi[n + wi[n]] packets are outstanding at that time,
wi[n+wi[n]]
2
packets need to arrive before the subflow can restart transmission. This occurs at
the end of block C, i.e., t = (n+ wi[n] +
wi[n+wi[n]]
2
)Ti. Finally, the acknowledgment
for the lost packet arrives at the end of block D at t = n + 2wi[n], ending fast
retransmission.
To model MPTCP’s behavior during fast retransmission, we use qi[n] as the
indicator variable set to 1 if a packet is dropped at t = nTi on path i and is zero
otherwise, i.e., qi[n] = 1li(nTi)=Ni . Note that a packet lost at time t = nTi implies
4
wi[n] = τi[0]Ci +Ni. (4.8)
Using the indicator function q[k] we can model the congestion window on path
3Notice that the transmission time of a packet over path i is equal to Ti, which means that wi[n]
packets are transmitted in wi[n]Ti seconds.
4the queue is full and τi[0]Ci packets are on the links
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i as
wi[k] = A(1− q[k − 2wi[n]]) +Bq[k − 2wi[n]],
∀k ∈ {1, 2, 3 . . . },
A =
(
wi[k − 1] + Ii(ws)(1− q[k − wi[n]]) (4.9)
− wi[k − 1]
2
q[k − wi[n]]
)
,
B = wi[k − wi[n]], (4.10)
where we have used A and B as auxiliary variables. Similarly, we can write
ssthreshi = Si as
Si[k] = Si[k − 1](1− q[k − wi[n]) + wi[k]
2
q[k − wi[n]]. (4.11)
Note that equations (4.9)-(4.10) do not track the congestion window during fast
retransmit, but this is fine as it is reset when fast retransmit ends. To capture the
evolution of the bottleneck queue and the transmission rate xi[k], we introduce the
indicator variable zi[k] that tracks if and when a subflow is in block C. Specifically,
we define zi[k] as
zi[k] =zi[k − 1](1− q[k − wi[n+ wi[n]]
2
− wi[n]])
+ (1− zi[k − 1])q[k − wi[n]], (4.12)
Where we set zi[0] = 0.
Note that both terms in (4.12) remain zero until q[k − wi[n]] = 1 after which
zi[k] = 1, and remains constant until q[k − wi[n+wi[n]]2 −wi[n]] = 1. Hence, capturing
the duration of block C.
Because in mode 2, Ii(ws) << 1, we have wi[n + wi[n]] ' wi[n] + Ii(ws)wi[n] '
wi[n]. Assuming that we allow the transmission of partial packets, we can now
write
xi[k] =
(
Ci + Ii(ws)Ci(1− q[k − wi[n]])
)
(1− zi[k]), (4.13)
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thus completing our model for subflow i in mode 2. In section 4.1.10 we will use
the model developed in this section to provide insight into the behaviors observed
in Section 4.1.3.
4.1.10 Analyzing our MPTCP Model
We analyze our model in Section 4.1.5 to investigate why MPTCP’s initial choice
of path can impact its performance. We use Ii(ws) as defined by (4.1) to represent
MPTCP’s joint congestion control. We will show that the coupled nature of Ii(ws)
is at the root of the differences observed in Section 4.1.3.
4.1.11 A Closer Look at Ii(ws)
MPTCP’s design goals are noted in Section 4.1.2. Satisfying these goals requires
that each of MPTCP’s subflows “cooperate” in increasing their congestion window
so as to, not violate the required fairness property. This introduces a coupling in
the congestion control protocol across subflows. An example of such a congestion
control protocol is the LIA of (4.1).
Designed to satisfy MPTCP’s design goals5, the coupling imposed by Ii(ws) has
unexpected consequences that need to be accounted for. One of these unintended
consequences is that the coupling in increasing the congestion control windows
also couples the effects of the initial choice of path to the performance of MPTCP.
We illustrate why in the following.
Using t = 0 to mark the time where the second subflow is established, we first
look at the case where the path with lower propagation delay i.e., path 1, is used
to initiate the connection. In this situation w1(0) = w2(0) + ∆w for some values of
∆w. This allows us to arrive at the following proposition:
5The work in [78] has shown that this congestion control mechanism does not really satisfy all
of the design goals.
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Proposition 1. If path 1 is used to initiate the connection, then (4.1) for Ii(ws) reduces to
I(xs) =
x1
τ1(x1 + x2)2
∀i ∈ {1, 2}, (4.14)
where xs = (x1(t), x2(t)). Thus, the following set of equations can be used to characterize
the solution to (4.3)
x2(t) = K
′x1(t)
τ1
τ2 (4.15)
x1(t) +
K ′2
(2 τ1
τ2
− 1)x1(t)
(2
τ1
τ2
−1)
+
2K ′
( τ1
τ2
)
x1(t)
τ1
τ2 =
t
τ 21
+K2
K ′ =
x2(0)
x1(0)
τ1
τ2
K2 = x1(0) +
K ′2
(2 τ1
τ2
− 1)x1(0)
(2
τ1
τ2
−1)
+
2K ′
( τ1
τ2
)
x1(0)
τ1
τ2 .
It is clear from (4.15) that x1(t) and x2(t) have a nonlinear dependence on the
initial values x1(0), x2(0) when the subflows are operating in mode 1.
Next, we look at the case where the path with higher propagation delay, path
2, is used to initiate the MPTCP connection. We arrive at the following:
Proposition 2. If path 2 is used to initiate the connection then (4.1) for Ii(ws) can be
written as:
I1(xs) =

x2
τ2(x1+x2)2
if τ1 >
δ(w1(0)+
√
w1(0)2+∆ww1(0))
∆w
x2
τ2(x1+x2)2
if τ1 <
δ(w1(0)−
√
w1(0)2+∆ww1(0))
∆w
x1
τ1(x1+x2)2
otherwise
I2(xs) =

x2
τ2(x1+x2)2
if τ1 >
δ(w1(0)+
√
w1(0)2+∆ww1(0))
∆w
x2
τ2(x1+x2)2
if τ1 <
δ(w1(0)−
√
w1(0)2+∆ww1(0))
∆w
x1
τ1(x1+x2)2
2τ1 > τ2
min( x1
τ1(x1+x2)2
, 1
x2τ2
) otherwise
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If I2(xs) = I1(xs) = x2τ2(x1+x2)2 , then we have that
x2(t) = K
′x1(t)
τ1
τ2 (4.16)
x1(t) +
K ′2
(2 τ1
τ2
− 1)x1(t)
(2
τ1
τ2
−1)
+
2K ′
( τ1
τ2
)
x1(t)
τ1
τ2 =
t
τ 21
+K2
K2 = x1(0) +
K ′2
(2 τ1
τ2
− 1)x1(0)
(2
τ1
τ2
−1)
+
2K ′
( τ1
τ2
)
x1(0)
τ1
τ2
K ′ =
x2(0)
x1(0)
τ1
τ2
Otherwise, if I2(xs) = I1(xs) = x1τ1(x1+x2)2 , x1(t) and x2(t) can be defined as in (4.15).
Proof of Proposition 1-2 is omitted due to space constraints. Propositions 1
and 2 clearly indicate that one should expect a difference in MPTCP transmission
rate in mode 1 when the path starting the connection is changed. Further note that
this impact is mainly due to the coupling introduced by Ii(ws), and therefore, is
inherent in the MPTCP protocol design. Propositions 1 and 2 do not quantify this
difference, or indicate how long the difference would persist once both MPTCP
subflows exit mode 1.
4.1.12 The Overall Impact Of the “First” Path
We have shown that MPTCP’s initial choice of path can impact its performance
through the coupled nature of its congestion control mechanism. The analysis,
focused on the situation where both subflows were in mode 1. Beyond mode 1, in
order to observe the impact of MPTCP’s initial choice of path on its performance
over a relatively long period of time and to see whether or not the effect lasts for the
entire duration of its operation, we use a sliding window to characterize MPTCP’s
transmission rate over a period of 1000 seconds.
Figure 4.5 depicts this quantity for a situation where C1 = C2 = C = 10 Mbps,
τ1 = 200 ms, τ2 = 280 ms, and N1 = N2 = 85 packets6. The size of the window
6This is done using a numerical solution to our model.
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Figure 4.5: Change in transmission rate computed in a sliding window of 1 sec-
onds for different “first” paths. C1 = C2 = 10 Mbps, τ1 = 200ms, and τ2 = 280ms.
The path starting second, is established at t = 3 seconds.
itself is taken to be 1 seconds, and it is moved by the transmission time of a packet
i.e., 1
C
. The queues are chosen to be large so that the congestion window on each
subflow can grow before a loss occurs so as to stay in mode 2 even after the loss is
detected.
Figure 4.5, depicts three different possibilities for starting the connection, either
path 1 is used to initiate the connection (blue/solid line), or path 2 is used to ini-
tiate the connection (red/dashed line), or both paths start in the established state
at the same time (black/dotted line). The figure shows a difference in MPTCP’s
transmission rate between the three different scenarios for t < 300 secs. Note that
in each of these three scenarios there are two dominant points of discontinuity
corresponding to where each of the subflows exited mode 1.
Our results in Figure 4.5 indicate that it is possible for the MPTCP subflows
to take a relatively long time to reach “steady state”. They also show that the
optimal strategy in selecting the better path to start with, may vary depending on
the amount of data being transmitted. This being said, once both subflows have
exited mode 1, MPTCP’s transmission rate is relatively stable.7 Thus, the periodic
7Note, that the order in which paths started may indeed influence the frequency with which
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Figure 4.6: Total number of packets transmitted vs δ (ms). The total duration of
the experiment is 200 seconds for each data point. The figures depict the influence
of τ1, and C on the impact of the initial path.
arrival of ACKs, at least in this example, eliminates the dependency on the initial
starting path. One would expect that any parameter influencing transitions into
mode 2 e.g., the BDP, competing flows, retransmission timeouts, or AQM queues
should also influence the magnitude of the difference in overall throughput across
these three scenarios.
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Figure 4.7: Total number of packets transmitted vs δ (ms). The total duration of
the experiment is 1000 seconds for each data point. The figures depict the influence
of the duration of the transmission on the effects observed in Figure 4.7
.
Figure 4.6 shows how the BDP influences the impact of the starting subflow on
performance. The y-axis ranges over [170 − 350] KPackets ([255 − 525] Mbytes),
where each packet is 1460 bytes and each data point shows MPTCP’s throughput
over a period of 200 seconds. We can see in Figure 4.6b that the maximum differ-
losses are observed on each path. However, for the time being we assume that this effect is rela-
tively minor for the situation considered, where there is no transition from mode 2 to mode 1.
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ence in throughput between the three different possible choices of the first paths is
10%. Decreasing the BDP by reducing the round trip times, as in Figure 4.6a, the
maximum difference becomes about 20%. Note that the impact of the decrease in
RTT is two fold, not only does it effect the BDP, but it also increases ∂xi
∂t
(equation
4.3). We also see that by increasing the BDP by changing the bottleneck bandwidth,
C = 20, the influence of the initial choice of path is increased to up to 45% and it is
reversed so that using the path of lower RTT provides better performance. Finally,
Figure 4.6 indicates, that it is possible that in some situations starting a connection
with the “worse” path results in a performance improvement.
Based on the results presented in Figure 4.5, we also expect that the choice of
“best” path to initiate the connection should also depend on the duration of the
transmission8. Figure 4.7 confirms this hypothesis. Figure 4.7 shows MPTCP’s
throughput over a period of 1000 seconds in the same three scenarios of Figure 4.6
(the range of the y-axis is [1.4− 3.1] MPackets([2.1− 4.6] Gbytes)). We can see that
the difference in the three paths performance has decreased to 1% in Figure 4.7a,
6% in Figure 4.7b, and 15% in Figure 4.7c. Notice that looking at a longer period of
time in the scenario of Figures 4.7c and 4.6c, the use of the higher RTT path results
in better performance.
It is also of interest to see how the the difference in the two paths start times
(indicated as the time lag in our earlier experiments), ∆t, effects the magnitude of
the differences observed. In MPTCP’s normal operation the ∆t is only due to the
delay caused by the three way handshake of the second path, which is relatively
small. The results shown so far in this section use ∆t = 3 seconds. We conduct fur-
ther experiments to vary ∆t. As expected the change in ∆t has a higher influence
when path 2 is the starting path (Preposition 2).
Our observations indicate that the choice of which path MPTCP starts with
could have a significant impact on performance depending on the size of the file
8Or alternatively the size of the file being transmitted.
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to be transmitted, the BDP of the paths, and whether or not, and how fast, the
subflows are able to reach mode 2. Furthermore, our observations show, that this
impact is more significant in better network conditions and that it is possible in
some situations that starting with the worse path results in better overall perfor-
mance.
4.1.13 Discussion
We have shown that the coupling introduced by MPTCP’s congestion control mech-
anisms introduces unexpected behaviors in terms of the influence of its initial
choice of path. In our work we flush out the cause of such behavior through a
stylized mathematical analysis of the protocol (such a model may also be useful
in studying other aspects of the protocol as well). It is expected that the design
of a scheduler based on a more comprehensive study of this impact would allow
for improved MPTCP performance. It is important to be aware of these impacts
when studying the protocol in order to avoid undesirable interactions. This being
said, we think it would be beneficial to decouple the two by initiating the multi
path communication at the application layer. By doing so, we trade of fine grained
control of the traffic distribution for less complexity in design. This also allows us
to extend our definition of multi path to go beyond the use of different routes in
the network in end to end protocols. In the next chapter we present our design of
this system.
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Chapter 5
Multipath at The Application Layer
In the previous chapter, we analyzed a simple model of the Multipath transport
protocol and showed that there exists complex interactions between the various
modules of the protocol. Such interactions can potentially have high impact on
client performance. Due to this complexity and the lack of understanding of its
possible implications, the protocol is not entirely suitable for performance sensitive
applications such as video delivery. We instead propose a multi path approach in
the application layer. Such an approach further allows us to expand our notion
of multi path to take advantage of the geographic diversity of content delivery
networks. Namely, in this context, multi path not only refers to multiple path
inside the network but also potentially multiple end point locations. Furthermore,
such a design allows us to avoid changing both endpoints. Instead a client side
application can achieve the same level of resilience to failures as that of a multipath
transport protocol without requiring cooperation from the server-side operators.
This further allows for the new protocol to take advantage of caches that might
exist in different parts of the network as they need not be updated to serve the
new clients. Next, we propose one such solution and outline the various aspects
that need to be considered in its design.
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5.1 Introduction
The growing importance of video traffic is by now well-documented, with the
share of video traffic on North American networks exceeding 70% of peak hour
traffic in early 2016 and expected to surpass 80% by the end of 2020 [121]. And
while its dominance is not as strong on mobile access links where it now repre-
sents about 40% of peak traffic, it is a major factor there as well. Furthermore, this
growth appears unimpeded by continued progress in codec efficiency, e.g. x265 or
VP9 codecs [82, 130, 104].
In the face of such a trend, or maybe because of it, there are, however, per-
sistent problems when it comes to ensuring quality video delivery. For example,
Conviva VXR reports, e.g.[42, 44, 43], which each year track various video perfor-
mance metrics, report that buffering events (periods during which the video stalls
to replenish its playback buffer) remain common (from 20% to 40% depending on
location), as do drop in video resolution while playing (those affect over 50% of
all videos). Equally important, degradation in video quality is also known to have
a major impact on users’ behavior and their satisfaction with Internet video [81].
This is obviously of concern, as articulated in several recent industry forums fo-
cused on video delivery [30, 31, 32, 33].
The first goal of this paper is, therefore, to explore possible solutions to remedy
this situation and improve the quality of Internet video delivery. Of interest in this
context is the use of multipath solutions, and in particular solutions that let video
clients download video segments (chunks) simultaneously from multiple servers.
We refer to such solutions as Multipath-MultiServer (MuMS), e.g.[118, 40]. Re-
liance on multiple paths from distinct servers can help mitigate exposure to quality
degradations caused by congestion or failure of individual paths, and server over-
load. In particular, multipath has been shown useful in improving throughput and
reliability in both wired and wireless networks [10, 35, 37, 58, 63, 115], and there is
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initial evidence that it could also benefit delay [74] as well as rate stability [12]. The
latter is of particular interest, as rate variations are a major factor in video quality
degradation.
Specifically, a typical video streaming client operates in two phases [117]: pre-
buffering and re-buffering. A video is split into segments (chunks), and in the
pre-buffering phase the client requests chunks at the maximum rate allowed by
the network1. Once there are enough chunks in the client’s playback buffer, it
starts playing the video and switches to re-buffering mode. In this mode, the client
requests chunks at a fixed rate determined by the encoding rate. Video playback
proceeds smoothly as long as chunks are in the playback buffer before they need
to be played-out. Variations in transmission capacity between the server(s) and the
client can result in late delivery or loss of video chunks. This, in turn, depletes the
playback buffer and eventually induces video stalls or skips.
A popular approach for dealing with variations in transmission capacity is
adaptive bit rates (ABR) [56, 34] – sometimes also called HTTP Adaptive Stream-
ing (HAS). Under ABR/HAS, the client changes its encoding bit rate to match the
capacity available in the network and avoid losses/delays. However, rate changes
remain visible to the viewer and still translate in degraded quality of experience
(QoE) [125, 59, 122], albeit at a lesser level. As a result, it remains desirable to de-
vise solutions that eliminate or mitigate variations in transmission rate, and there-
fore preserve video quality without having to resort to (coding) rate adjustments.
This is one of the goals of our solution, Sunstar, which seeks to leverage multi-
ple paths to different servers to maintain a stable transmission rate even in the
presence of network variations (on individual paths). In this respect, Sunstar is
complementary to ABR-based solutions.
Another goal of Sunstar is to realize its goal of mitigating rate variations with-
1This holds for both video download and live-streaming, though with obvious limitations on
the pre-buffering phase for the latter.
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out impacting peering costs, i.e. the costs video providers incur from Internet Ser-
vice Providers (ISPs) for delivering video to their customers. Ensuring that better
quality in video delivery does not translate into higher peering costs is of partic-
ular importance given the low profit margins under which most video providers
operate [19, 24, 46]. Of concern in our context is the extent to which reliance on
multiple paths might increase peering costs. The possibility of such increases is, in
hindsight, intuitive given the non-linear nature of most ISPs’ charging model, i.e.
most charge based on the 95th percentile of usage in 5 mins intervals over a period
of a month2. Spreading transmissions over multiple paths means that a separate
95th percentile is now computed on each path, which, as discussed in Section 5.2,
can result in a higher overall cost value.
In summary, Sunstar’s main contributions are as follows:
A cost-neutral solution to improving video delivery. We develop a principled un-
derstanding of how different mechanisms for improving video delivery, including
multipaths, contribute to higher (peering) costs. We use this understanding to
develop a scheduler capable of delivering significant performance improvements
with little to no impact on cost.
A video client improving users’ QoE. We implement a user-space version of a Sun-
star video client, and demonstrate its benefits by quantifying its ability to minimize
video stalls/skips across a broad range of network impairments. Our Emulab [131]
results indicate that Sunstar can improve video performance quality by up to 50%
or more in various settings.
5.2 MuMS Benefits and Implications
Before presenting Sunstar, we first motivate a MuMS approach by showing the
type of performance improvements achievable when downloading from multiple
2See https://www.noction.com/blog/95th_percentile_explained.
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servers. Next, we offer insight into the relationship that exists between perfor-
mance and (peering) cost, and in particular why reliance on multiple paths, as in
MuMS, can result in higher costs. This serves as a motivation for Sunstar, which
seeks a balance between performance and cost.
5.2.1 Performance Benefits
A MuMS solution should improve users’ QoE as multiple servers (and the paths
from those servers) are unlikely to simultaneously experience congestion or fail-
ures. To assess the significance of those gains, we compare the performance of a
MuMS client to that of a single-server client in an Emulab experiment. To simplify
our setup, in all cases clients use only a single path to each server.
The Emulab connection between the client and each server consists of two links
separated by a shaping node with a buffer size of 50 packets. To create an environ-
ment that exercises bandwidth limitations, the available bandwidth to each server
from the client was set to an average value equal to its download rate T (as de-
termined by the video player), but with variations between T
2
and 3T
2
. This was
achieved using dummynet [29] on the shaping node. Each client repeatedly down-
loads a large video (5 minutes or more) and is assigned to a fixed set of n servers
where n is either 1, 2, or 3. In all cases, video download proceeds by issuing http
get requests at a rate commensurate with that of the video. In the single-server
case, TCP controls the actual download rate. In the multi-server case, a standard
TCP-like application-level congestion control mechanism determines the available
rate from each server, and when multiple servers are available, the lowest RTT
server is selected. This represents a relatively basic “scheduler,” which neverthe-
less serves the purpose of demonstrating the benefits of a MuMS solution.
In evaluating performance, we focus on two metrics of importance to video
QoE, namely, the fraction of time clients are stalled (because their playback buffer
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is empty), the average stall duration, and the number of video chunks the client’s
player skips. Previous studies [18, 69, 50] have verified the correlation between
user satisfaction and these metrics. We further verify their impact on user experi-
ence through a Mechanical Turk experiment described in Appendix B.1. Note that
there is an inherent trade-off between the two metrics. A short time-out for chunks
increases skips but minimizes stalls, while increasing the time-out has the opposite
result.
Figure 5.1: Average stall duration across clients.
Figures 5.1-5.2 report the distribution of the average stall time, as well as the
fraction of the total download time clients, are stalled across clients for the 1, 2,
and 3-server configurations respectively, while Figure 5.3 focuses on the distribu-
tion of the number of skipped video chunks for the same configurations. The con-
fidence intervals in the figure show the 95th percentile confidence interval based
on assuming a binomial distribution for data in each bin. The figures establish the
benefits of a MuMS solution, which is successful in reducing both stalls duration
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Figure 5.2: Fraction of total download time each client was stalled (across clients).
and the number of skips. For example, more than 91% of 3-server clients saw no
stalls, while the number was 90% for 2-server clients, and 73% for single-server
clients; and those benefits persist among clients that experienced longer stalls on
average. Similarly, over 90% (82%) of 3-server (2-server) clients did not experience
any skips, while this number drops to below 80% for single-server clients, with
again the benefits of a MuMS solution extending to the tail of the distribution.
In Section 5.4, we show how Sunstar’s more sophisticated scheduler can yield
further improvements.
5.2.2 Cost-Performance Trade-offs
There are multiple options to improve video delivery. A simple approach is to
download the video at the highest possible rate from one or more servers, as it
should minimize the odds of a chunk arriving late and/or the playback buffer run-
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Figure 5.3: Distribution of the number of skipped chunks.
ning empty3. This is why works such as [40] focus on maximizing clients’ through-
put during their “on” period (the time during which the client fills its playback
buffer).
However, while performance benefits are intuitive, it is unclear how such a
scheme affects cost. On one hand, a download strategy that maximizes throughput
has clients leaving the system earlier, which can reduce bandwidth usage when
computed over 5 minute intervals. On the other hand, the higher download rates
while clients are present can increase bandwidth usage. How these two opposing
factors contribute to 95th-percentile costs is not obvious at first sight.
To gain a better understanding of this trade-off, we develop a simple analytical
model to evaluate the impact of the download rate on peering costs. We consider
a scenario where: (1) clients connect to a fixed set of k servers with distinct peering
links for each server; (2) clients download a video of size S at a constant aggregate
3Note though that this comes at the expense of larger playback buffers at the clients, and a
potential waste of bandwidth when clients abandon watching the video halfway.
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rate of T and distribute download requests equally across servers (the download
rate for each server is T/k); (3) clients arrive according to a Poisson process of rate
λ; and (4) peering costs follow a q-percentile model (q = 95 in a typical scenario).
Theorem 3 establishes that the higher the download rate T , the higher the peer-
ing cost. In other words, while a more aggressive download strategy may improve
performance, it results in higher costs.
Theorem 3. Given clients arriving according to a Poisson process and downloading equally
from k servers at an aggregate rate of T , the q-percentile peering cost is an increasing func-
tion of T .
Proof. Assuming a properly provisioned system, i.e. non-blocking, each server
plus peering link combination behaves as an M/G/∞ system whose occupancy
probability is given by pii = e
−ρρi
i!
, where ρ = λS/k
T/k
= λS
T
. Assuming ρ is large, i.e. we
are dealing with large systems, pii can be approximated by a normal distribution
with mean and variance equal to ρ.
The q-percentile occupancy n(q) of the system (each client is assigned one “server”
with a service/download rate of T/k) is then of the form
φ
(
n(q)− ρ√
ρ
)
= q
where φ(x) is the CDF of the normal distribution. This implies n(q)−ρ√
ρ
= α where α
is a positive constant, e.g. for q = 0.95, α = 1.64. Thus, n(q) = α
√
ρ + ρ, and the
q-percentile traffic volume on the corresponding peering link is n(q)T/k. Hence,
under a q-percentile cost model, the peering cost for the system is Cq(λ, T, k) ∼
(c
√
ρ+ ρ)T/k, an increasing function of T .
Although Theorem 3 relies on a number of simplifying assumptions, it never-
theless captures the key factor that while increasing download rates allows clients
to leave the system faster (and improves video quality), its overall impact on cost
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is negative. In other words, downloading at the lowest possible rate that meets the
video requirements yields the lowest cost. As described in Section 5.3, we leverage
this insight in designing the Sunstar scheduler.
5.2.3 Impact of MuMS on Cost
The previous section established that a greedy/aggressive download strategy had
a negative impact on cost. In this section, we show that the multiple paths of a
MuMS’ solution have a similar effect.
For that purpose and without loss of generality, we consider a system with a
single server reachable by clients over either one or two peering links. When two
peering links are available, clients split their traffic across the two links accord-
ing to some strategy. Under the two peering links configuration, we denote as x1
and x2 the vectors of traffic volumes recorded in 5 minute intervals on links 1-2,
respectively.
In the absence of significant rate variations on either peering link, the traffic
volumes on the single peering link configurations are of the form x = x1 +x2. This
readily gives
max(x) ≤ max(x1) + max(x2) (5.1)
There are obviously additional factors at play when considering the multiple
servers of MuMS clients and a 95th percentile, rather than peak, charging model.
Nevertheless, this captures a fundamental aspect of multipath scenarios that points
to a negative impact on cost. Mitigating this impact is one of the goals of Sunstar.
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5.3 Sunstar Client Design
As discussed in Section 5.2, realizing the lowest possible cost calls for downloading
at the lowest possible rate, while meeting the video’s target rate of T . Blindly fol-
lowing such a recommendation is, however, likely to result in poor performance.
Sunstar seeks to instead minimize rate variance, while guaranteeing a sufficient av-
erage download rate. Minimizing rate variance still favors lower rates, but at the
same time also aims for rate stability. A more stable download rate can, in turn,
mitigate playback disruptions by ensuring a regular replenishing of the playback
buffer, even during periods of network fluctuations.
5.3.1 Sunstar Client Design Overview
The Sunstar client design assumes that video content is replicated across multiple
servers. Upon requesting a video, a client is assigned a given set of servers. This
is done through a server selection algorithm imposed by the CDN and can be re-
alized through manifest files that clients can download from a designated server.
The client is an application layer client that downloads and plays back videos by
sending requests for fixed size chunks to its assigned servers using http range re-
quests. It adapts the number of chunks requested from each server at runtime
based on current performance measures. This calls for both estimating the band-
width available to each server to avoid congesting the network or servers, and for
distributing requests across paths to meet cost and performance objectives.
Specifically, the current Sunstar client realizes the following functionality:
Bandwidth estimation. The client updates its estimates of the bandwidth available
on each path using a TCP-like AIMD mechanism, which computes a window size
(in chunks) for each path. This provides upper bounds for the number of requests
that can be sent to each server. Specifically, we use a TCP CUBIC congestion control
mechanism to adapt the window size to server i. CUBIC, however, relies on losses
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to reduce its window size, and since chunks are requested over http, there is no
application level loss in the Sunstar client. We use a drop of more than 20% in the
estimated average rate to server i as equivalent to a CUBIC packet loss.
Request scheduling. The client dynamically adapts the number of chunks to re-
quest from each server. In particular, the Sunstar scheduler (see Section 5.3.2) aims
to optimize the user’s QoE by allocating chunk requests to minimize rate variabil-
ity.
Out-of-order delivery. As with other multipath solutions, chunks requested from
different servers may arrive out of order. We take an approach similar to MPTCP
in dealing with this issue, namely, split the client design into two layers. The lower
layer consists of individual http connections or subflows, each responsible for send-
ing requests to a single server. Upon receiving responses to requests, the subflow
passes them up to the upper layer that reassembles them in the correct order.
Performance optimizations. The Sunstar client incorporates optimizations previ-
ously devised for MPTCP. In particular, it employs opportunistic retransmit. When
latencies across servers are significantly different, opportunistic retransmit pre-
vents the client from stalling while waiting for a chunk requested from a high la-
tency server. A mechanism similar to TCP timeouts is also implemented for chunk
requests. If a response is not received before a timeout, the request is re-sent to
another server. Last, we limit the number of retries for chunk requests to bound
playback stalls. Once this retry limit is exhausted, the chunk is skipped and the
player relies on its codec to mask missing frames.
We acknowledge that an alternative to an application layer solution is a trans-
port layer one, i.e. by extending a protocol such as MPTCP. A transport layer solu-
tion has advantages such as finer adaptation granularity and, therefore, faster re-
actions. However, extending MPTCP to work in a multi-server rather than single-
server setting involves non-trivial changes to the network protocol stack. In addi-
tion, the tight coupling of MPTCP components can result in unexpected interac-
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tions [14]. Avoiding or predicting them calls for a careful evaluation of proposed
changes. Hence, an application layer solution offers a number of benefits, in terms
of flexibility and ease of deployment.
Note also that while, as mentioned earlier, Sunstar is complementary to ABR
solutions, combining Sunstar with an effective ABR strategy, i.e. deciding when
to adjust coding rates, is not addressed in the current Sunstar client design. Ex-
tending the design to make it fully compatible with ABR solutions is part of future
work.
5.3.2 The Sunstar Scheduler
The scheduler is the core component of the Sunstar client4. Its main goal is to
minimize playback stalls as their frequency and duration are known to have a
significant influence on users’ QoE [18, 69] (see also our Mechanical Turk exper-
iments in Appendix B.1). Playback stalls are a direct consequence of an empty
playback buffer, which arises when the download rate falls below the playback
rate for an extended period of time. To minimize the odds of such occurrences, the
Sunstar scheduler periodically runs an optimization process that computes how
many chunks to request from each server to ensure a target average download
rate while minimizing variations around that average rate.
The optimization is greedy and myopic, i.e. based on current performance es-
timates for the paths to each server and does not attempt to predict future per-
formance. It operates in “epochs” or “rounds”, whereby in each epoch it seeks to
minimize the increase in variance in that round. The optimization takes as input
the current window size of each server (an upper bound on its rate), its current
estimate of the (average) rate to each server, and the number of pending requests
4We show in Sections 5.4 and 5.5 that it not only delivers significantly better performance than
other schedulers, but that it realizes those performance improvements with little to no impact on
cost.
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to each server. It then computes a target rate (number of requests) for each server
in the next epoch. This rate is used by the scheduler to schedule requests to the
servers.
The rest of this subsection describes the formulation of this optimization pro-
cess in more details.
Scheduler Optimization
Let S be the set of servers assigned to a MuMS client. The goal is to guarantee each
client an average rate T , while minimizing changes in the running variance:
(
∑
i∈S
αiRi − T )2, (5.2)
where Ri is the inverse of the time it takes for requests to arrive from server i (in
other words Ri is the inverse of the application level round trip time), and αi is the
number of chunks that the client has requested from server i. The client’s attained
rate is thus
∑
i αiRi.
This translates to solving the following optimization:
min
α
|
∑
i∈S
αiRi − T | (5.3)
s.t.
∑
i∈S
αiR̂i ≥ T
αi ≤ wi,
where R̂i is the expectation ofRi, andwi the current window size to server i. LetRui
andRli be upper and lower bounds forRi, respectively. Ru andRl can be estimated
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using Chebychev’s inequality. Equation 5.3 is then equivalent to:
min
α,t
t (5.4)
s.t.
∑
i∈S
αiR̂i ≥ T∑
i∈S
αiR̂
u
i ≤ T + t∑
i∈S
αiR̂
l
i ≤ T − t
αi ≤ wi.
Equation 5.4 is derived by first converting the absolute value form of the problem
to its linear form and then replacing the two resulting bounded constraints with
tighter bounds through Rui and Rli.
The above formulation assumes integer values for αi, but this can occasionally
result in significant overshoots in the realized rate. We, therefore, use fractional
values for αi. However, because requests are for an integer number of chunks, we
maintain a state variable that accounts for the “excess” rate yi to each server. After
solving the optimization, we compute max(αiRi − yi, 0) and use this value as the
target rate to server i. When this corresponds to a fractional number of chunks, we
then round it up and update yi accordingly.
There are two other aspects to the above optimization that need discussion, as
they affect the implementation of the Sunstar scheduler.
The first is Dealing with Infeasibility. As network bandwidth fluctuates, the
above optimization may not always be feasible. However, we still want the client
to request the best possible transmission rate. For that purpose, we progressively
decrease the target rate T (by 10% in our experiments) and rerun the optimization
until a feasible solution is found. Conversely, following a period of rate deficit,
we seek to increase the target rate whenever feasible to make up for the deficit.
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Specifically, we run the optimization for a higher target rate (typically 30%) until
the deficit has been absorbed.
The second issue concerns Breaking ties. The optimization need not have a
unique solution, e.g. with homogeneous paths with sufficient bandwidth, using
any of them is a feasible and optimal solution. We, therefore, add two tie-breaking
criteria to the optimization: (1) we minimize the number of servers used, and (2)
we favor those that have been used more frequently in the past. Both criteria aim
to reduce the number of out-of-order chunks.
max(x) = max(x1 + x2) ≤ max(x1) + max(x2). (5.5)
Hence, under a peak rate charging model, a single path solution yields a lower
cost.
We show in Section 5.4.5 that the optimization of Equation 5.4 is practical in
that it can be solved for up to 4 servers in less than 1ms without overloading an
entry-level machine5. We also note that it is possible to improve the optimization
run time by re-using past solutions as a starting point in each round [22]. Such
improvements are, however, beyond the scope of this paper.
5.4 Performance Evaluation
We implemented a prototype of the Sunstar client, and carried out a number of
experiments to evaluate its behavior along the following dimensions: (1) improve-
ments in video quality over a single server client; (2) improvements in video qual-
ity compared to two representative multi-server schedulers, an RTT-based sched-
uler6 similar to that used (at the transport layer) by MPTCP, and the YouTuber
5Note though, that the complexity of solving the problem grows relatively fast with the number
of servers and variables.
6We refer to it in the paper as the min-RTT scheduler.
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(a) Distribution of the fraction of time clients
stalled in each run.
(b) Distribution of the number of chunks
skipped in each run.
Figure 5.4: Comparison to single path. High and medium bandwidth scenarios
were used with smooth bandwidth variations.
scheduler of [40]; (3) its run-time performance, in particular, that of its core opti-
mization routine.
5.4.1 Evaluation Setup
Our evaluation setup is similar to that of Section 5.2, but spans a broader set of
scenarios to offer a more a comprehensive evaluation of Sunstar’s performance.
Our Sunstar prototype is a Linux-based MuMS client that retrieves video from
Nginx web servers. The videos are 250 MB and broken into fixed chunks of 102 KB
(we experimented with larger/smaller chunk sizes, and the results were similar).
The clients have a target rate of T = 4.08 Mbps (experiments at T = 360 Kbps
yielded similar results). The scheduler’s epoch is 10 ms.
As before, the experiments were carried out on the Emulab testbed. Clients
connect to servers via a dedicated “path” consisting of a link connecting the client
to a machine running dummynet, followed by a link connecting that machine to
the server. The dummynet machine on path i is used to add a fixed latency of 20ms
and vary the capacity available to the client on path i from 0 to Ci with an average
value of Ci/2. Those variations seek to capture the impact of interfering traffic on
the bandwidth available between clients and servers. We consider two types of
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bandwidth variations smooth and bursty. Under smooth variations, the available
bandwidth increases and decreases progressively in fixed small sized steps. This
is intended to capture scenarios where congestion from cross-traffic changes rela-
tively slowly. In contrast, bursty bandwidth variations are based on large sporadic
changes in available bandwidth that seek to mimic abrupt changes in congestion,
e.g. because of the start of a high-bandwidth download on a shared link.
In comparing the min-RTT and Sunstar schedulers, we explore both smooth
and bursty bandwidth variations. In the evaluation of Sunstar and in its compari-
son to the min-RTT schedulers, both configurations yield similar results so that we
typically report only one. In the comparison to the YouTuber scheduler of [40], we
focus on bursty bandwidth variations as rapid changes are expected to be the most
stressful to Sunstar’s ability to detect and adapt to bandwidth changes. In configu-
rations with smooth bandwidth variations both Sunstar and YouTuber performed
similarly.
Figure 5.5: High Ci comparison of the two schedulers (smooth bandwidth varia-
tions).
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We experiment with three configurations: (i) High Ci, where T  Ci/2 (the av-
erage available bandwidth significantly exceeds the client’s target rate); (ii) Medium
Ci where T + 1 Mbps ≤ Ci/2 ≤ T + 2 Mbps; (iii) Low Ci where Ci/2 < T . Note
that in the Low Ci scenario, multiple paths, and therefore servers, are necessary to
meet the client’s target rate.
Figure 5.6: Medium Ci comparison of the two schedulers (smooth bandwidth vari-
ations).
Performance metrics. As in Section 5.2, we measure QoE-based on [18, 69, 50]: (1)
the number of skipped chunks; and (2) the fraction of times clients are stalled.
5.4.2 Comparison to Single Server Clients
Our first set of experiments compares the performance of the Sunstar client to that
of a single server client. This repeats the earlier MuMS validation of Section 5.2,
with the main distinction that the Sunstar scheduler is now used instead of the
min-RTT scheduler. We report results only for the High Ci and Medium Ci config-
urations, since they are the only two for which an individual path has enough (av-
erage) bandwidth for a client. Statistics for stall durations and number of skipped
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Figure 5.7: Low Ci comparison of the two schedulers (smooth bandwidth varia-
tions).
chunks across both configurations are combined and shown in Figures 5.4a,5.4b,
respectively7. The figures confirm the results of Section 5.2, but now for the Sun-
star client. A casual comparison of, say, Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4b, also hints at
the Sunstar scheduler’s better performance over that of the min-RTT scheduler of
Section 5.2. We explore this aspect further in the next section.
5.4.3 Comparison to the Min-RTT scheduler
We focus on a configuration where a single client downloads videos from the same
set of servers (we vary the number of servers from 2 to 4). The client is either the
Sunstar client or a client where the Sunstar scheduler is replaced by a min-RTT
scheduler. Due to the high variance in the performance of the MinRTT scheduler,
7Error bars show the 95th percentile confidence intervals by assuming data in each bar is a
Bernoulli distributed random variable.
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Figure 5.8: Percentage of time stalled in a medium bandwidth/bursty scenario.
we report stall statistics8 in the form of scatter plots, where each datapoint com-
pares the Sunstar client to the minRTT scheduler (the large confidence intervals for
the min-RTT scheduler make the results hard to interpret otherwise). Points below
the x = y line indicate better performance for the Sunstar client. Results are shown
in Figure 5.5 to Figure 5.7 for the High, Medium and Low Ci configurations for
smooth link variations. Figure 5.8 presents results for one representative configu-
ration with bursty bandwidth variations, namely, the Medium configuration.
The figures show that the Sunstar scheduler consistently outperforms the min-
imum RTT scheduler irrespective of the number of servers used. As expected, the
biggest improvements arise in the Low Ci scenarios, where the limited resources
amplify the need for judicious scheduling decisions. The Medium Ci scenario still
8Results for skipped chunks statistics were of a similar nature.
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sees the Sunstar client outperforming the other two in most cases, while the differ-
ences are less pronounced in the High Ci scenario because the plentiful resources
ensure that all schedulers perform well. In the rest of the paper (unless explicitly
said otherwise), we focus on the Medium Ci scenario as it is more likely to arise in
practice.
Number
of servers
Percentage of time buffer
is empty – minRTT sched.
Percentage of time buffer
is empty – our sched.
2 50.75± 13.02 1.61± 0.15
3 1.25± 0.34 0.122± 0.098
4 0.114± 0.14 0.0145± 0.0236
Table 5.1: Percentage of time the playback buffers are empty when multiple clients
share the available links/servers simultaneously. We use 95th percentile confi-
dence intervals.
5.4.4 Comparison to The YouTuber Scheduler
The next set of experiments compare the Sunstar client to a client based on YouTuber [40].
YouTuber works by estimating the bandwidth to each server, and requests chunks
at a rate equal to that estimate. The original design of [40] only considers the case
of two servers. Hence, to ensure a fair comparison, we limit our experiments to
configurations with only two servers.
(a) Fraction of time stalled compared to the
YouTuber scheduler.
(b) Number of skipped bytes compared to the
YouTuber scheduler.
Figure 5.9: Comparing Sunstar scheduler with YouTuber scheduler for regular
video downloads
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Video Downloads. Our first set of experiments consider the case of stored video
downloads (as opposed to live streaming, which we consider next). We also al-
low the YouTuber an infinite buffer so as to maximize its performance. YouTuber
aims to estimate the bandwidth available in the network and send requests ac-
cordingly. We, therefore, compare our performance against that of YouTuber in a
bursty environment to contrast the two algorithms’ ability to adapt to such sudden
changes in bandwidth (and therefore their resilience to prediction errors). Since the
YouTuber [40] scheduler requires the use of variable sized chunks, we compare the
number of skipped bytes instead of the number of skipped chunks. YouTuber also
lacks an explicit timeout mechanism. We, therefore, add a timeout period of 10s
to YouTuber when it stalls. At the end of the timeout period, 16 KB of data (its
minimum chunk size) is skipped. This avoids penalizing YouTuber for the lack of
timeouts (in which case it would stall for long periods of time).
Figures 5.9a-5.9b summarizes the comparison for the two QoE metrics of stalls
and skipped bytes. The data is shown in the form of boxplots to be able to show
the results for each metric separately. For completeness, we also include results
for the min-RTT scheduler. The box boundaries show the 25th and 75th percentiles
of the data while the red lines show the median. The whiskers show the most ex-
treme data points in the data. Our results indicate that when link variations are
busty, the Sunstar schedulers outperform the YouTuber scheduler in terms of the
fraction of time stalled (both in median and in the tail). The Sunstar scheduler
is slightly worse in terms of the number of bytes skipped, but the difference is
mostly attributed to the explicit timeout added to YouTuber. When link variations
are smooth, Youtuber performs similar to the Sunstar scheduler and we omit the
presentation. All in all, Sunstar performs better than Youtuber, and the main rea-
son is due to Sunstar’s ability to do finer timescale adaptation accompanied by its
use of opportunistic retransmits, while Youtuber instead relies solely on TCP to
recover from losses, failures, and sudden bandwidth changes. We note that with-
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out the explicit timeout mechanism added to Youtuber, this protocol will end up
stalling for long periods – a drawback that Sunstar avoids.
Mis-matched RTTs. We next look at the effect of mismatched RTTs on the different
schedulers. Using two servers, we create a mismatch in RTT, by configuring the
client to server latency for one to be higher by a delta (10-90ms) compared to the
other server. Figure 5.11 illustrates the results. The relative performance of the
different schedulers is preserved. The Sunstar scheduler continues to outperforms
both the min-RTT and YouTuber scheduler.
Live Streaming. Our next experiment aims to compare the three schedulers (Sun-
star, YouTuber, and min-RTT) when streaming live video content. Unlike the ear-
lier workload, live content is generated at a constant rate. We emulate a live
streaming experience by first writing the number of bytes equal to the client’s pre-
buffering threshold into a file. Subsequently, the server continues to write at a
constant rate of T to the file until the entire file is created. Clients start sending
requests after the pre-buffer portion of the file is created.
(a) Fraction of time stalled. (b) Number of skipped bytes.
Figure 5.10: Live streaming schedulers comparison - Medium Ci, bursty band-
width variations.
Figures 5.10a-5.10b illustrate the results. Sunstar outperforms all other sched-
ulers in both metrics. YouTuber has the worst performance out of the three (with
and without limited buffering) as it cannot accurately estimate the rate at which
content is generated at the server. YouTuber’s overly aggressive download strat-
egy that maximizes throughput will backfire as this results in unnecessary stalls.
The YouTuber design is based on an on/off model where the clients maximize
117
5.4. Performance Evaluation
throughput during “on” periods and fill their playback buffers after which they
stop and wait until the contents of the buffer drop below a certain threshold at
which point they go back into “on” mode. The player optimizes its performance
by predicting the bandwidth available to each server and requesting at the maxi-
mum rate possible. However, parts of the video may not be available at the time
a request is made. A limited buffer size should allow the client to pace itself to
download at a more reasonable rate. However, this does not allow YouTuber to
take full advantage of scenarios where a significant part of its benefits is coming
from: maximizing its download rate. It is, therefore, clear that Sunstar is a better
solution compared to YouTuber for handling live video content.
We repeated the above experiments with various sizes of pre-buffers, since
YouTuber’s performance may be affected by pre-buffer duration. We note that
while YouTuber performance improved with the increase in pre-buffer size, the
other two schedulers continued to significantly outperform it even with a pre-
buffer duration of 1 minute.
Figure 5.11: The effect of mismatched RTTs. RTT difference between the links is
denoted as δ.
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5.4.5 Scheduler Execution Time
The previous experiments validate Sunstar’s ability to select high-quality paths to
servers such that QoE metrics are achieved. Our next set of evaluations measure
the runtime of Sunstar’s scheduler. Recall that the optimization algorithm used
by the scheduler is run every epoch. Hence, it is essential that the scheduler is
efficient.
We conducted a number of experiments to evaluate the runtime performance
of our scheduling algorithm. We use the Mosek Solver [96] for the optimizer im-
plementation and it is executed every 10 ms. The Emulab machines used for our
experiments are Dell PowerEdge 2850s with a single 3GHz processor, 2GB of RAM,
and two 10,000 RPM 146GB SCSI disks [2]. Computing the optimal solution typ-
ically takes around 1 − 2 ms. The run times increase with the number of servers,
incurring an average time of 0.27 ± 0.0022 ms (two servers) and 2.20 ± 0.0026 ms
(four servers). Beyond four servers, the run time increases significantly – sug-
gesting that 4 servers offers a reasonable trade-off between execution times and
performance improvements.
5.5 Cost Impact
Sunstar is motivated by the need to improve video quality, but do so without nega-
tively impacting peering costs. The insight derived from Section 5.2 led to a design
that seeks to minimize rate variations while keeping the download rate as close as
possible to the target download rate. The previous section showed it was effective
in improving video quality. The focus here is on showing that those benefits are
realized without increasing the provider’s cost. Because the YouTuber scheduler
behaves aggressively when it comes to download rate, i.e. it seeks to use all the
available bandwidth, we expect that it will perform poorly when it comes to cost.
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We, therefore, focus our efforts on comparing the Sunstar client to a single server
solution (our baseline), and to a client using the Min-RTT scheduler.
We evaluate peering costs using a setup similar to that of Section 5.4. The main
differences are increases in both the number of clients simultaneously active, and
the number of servers available to them (we now have 10 servers to chose from).
The latter allows us to subsequently consider the impact of server selection on
cost, as part of a sensitivity analysis. While this section is only concerned with
cost, we also evaluated Sunstar’s performance and verified that its benefits remain
qualitatively similar to those of Section 5.4 in spite of the larger number of clients.
Figure 5.12: Peering costs under different schedulers and server selection ap-
proaches.
In a given round of experiment, clients connect to k out of 10 Emulab servers,
where k is a parameter that varies from 1 to 3. Since Emulab has a limited num-
ber of physical machines available, we configure each machine to have 10 active
clients at any point in time, for a total of 100 clients in the system. To emulate an
environment with clients coming and leaving, clients watch videos of fixed dura-
tion chosen from a set of {5, 10, 20, 30, 60} minutes long videos, and then leave to
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be replaced by a new client that randomly chooses a new video. Video selection
is biased towards shorter videos (based on the observation [61] that clients tend to
watch shorter duration videos).
Each physical machine has a dedicated link to a dummynet node through which
clients originating on that machine experience bandwidth variations that are inde-
pendent of those for clients on other machines. We use a Medium Ci configura-
tion, as described in the previous section, but scale the bandwidth by a factor 10
(the number of clients on the link). Low and high bandwidth scenarios yielded
qualitatively similar results. Each server is in turn logically connected to a single
peering link shared by all clients accessing it. The bandwidth on the peering link
is high enough to avoid congestion, independent of the number of clients assigned
to the server. New clients first connect to a “master” server, which redirects them
to a list of k servers, k = 1, 2, or 3, from which to download their video. The master
uses a round-robin server assignment strategy to select which k servers to assign
to a new client.
To allow a meaningful comparison, the same pattern of link bandwidth vari-
ations and server assignments are used across schedulers in a given experiment.
Individual experiments last for 4 hours, with the 95th percentile cost (traffic vol-
ume) of the provider obtained by summing the individual 95th percentiles costs of
the 10 servers in those 4 hours. Statistics are then computed over a set of 10 inde-
pendent experiments. The first five data points (from the left) of Figure5.12 report
results for the following configurations: SS (Single Server, our baseline reference),
mRTT-2 and mRTT-3 (for Min-RTT with 2 and 3 servers), and SS-2 and SS-3 (for
Sunstar with 2 and 3 servers). The definition of the boxplots used in the figure is
similar to that of Section 5.4.
We make two observations from the results of Figure 5.12. The first is a con-
firmation of the insight of Section 5.2.2, which forecast cost increases when us-
ing multiple servers. In particular, configurations with 2 and 3 servers and the
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min-RTT scheduler show clear increases over the single server case (about 20% for
3 servers). The second observation is that the strategy behind Sunstar is indeed
successful in both improving performance (as shown in Section 5.4), and realizing
those improvements with little to no impact on cost. In fact, our results suggest
that Sunstar actually reduces cost on average, suggesting that Sunstar is more cost
effective in some settings. Overall, our results show that Sunstar does improve
video quality, and does so without affecting the peering costs of video providers;
something they can ill afford.
In addition to assessing the benefits of Sunstar’s “smarter” scheduling deci-
sions, another question of interest is whether further improvements can be realized
by also optimizing the set of servers that clients are assigned to. To explore this is-
sue, we formulate the server assignment problem as a constrained optimization9
(see Appendix B.2 for details on this optimizations) that seeks to greedily minimize
increases in the 95th percentile cost when assigning servers to new clients, while
meeting client rate constraints.
The results from experiments combining this optimization with the Sunstar
scheduler are shown in the right-most part of Figure5.12 (labeled “Optimization”).
They highlight that the approach offers only limited benefits, at least when used
with the Sunstar scheduler (other experiments with the min-RTT scheduler showed
slightly larger improvements). This is likely due in part to the relatively balanced
request patterns used in our experiments, as well as the limited ability of a greedy
approach to accurately predict how different assignments affect the 95th percentile.
In addition, the Sunstar scheduler itself also contributes to this outcome, in that its
goal of keeping rates low is likely to already realize much of the achievable gains
in cost reductions. We repeated our experiment using a server selection strategy
that picks the k closest servers (lowest RTT), and again found little to no differ-
9Note that unlike the optimization of the Sunstar scheduler, this optimization is required only
once when a new client starts.
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ences in cost. A full assessment of the benefits of the server selection approach
of Appendix B.2 and other server selection algorithms across traffic scenarios is of
interest, and something we expect to explore as future work.
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Related Work
In this work we presented various algorithms that can be employed at the client
side of a communication to allow for higher resilience and network diagnosis at
low overhead. In this chapter we describe how these algorithms are different from
previous work in this space.
6.1 Network diagnosis
Identifying the source of failures in distributed systems and more specifically net-
works is a mature topic. In this section, we outline some of the key differences of
NetPoirot and Vigil with some of these works.
Anomaly detection in distributed systems [55, 70, 57, 73, 141, 47, 79] detect when
a failure has occurred using techniques such as PCA [57], Fourier transforms [141],
and decision trees [55]. The goal of NetPoirot is to find the entity responsible for
the failure. Vigil goes a step further by identifying the device responsible for the
failure.
Inference and Trace-Based Algorithms [17, 5, 145, 65, 60, 88, 119, 87, 84, 66] either
require (a) data not locally available to the client at runtime, (b) knowledge/in-
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ference of the probability distribution of failure on each device in the system, (c)
high resource consumption at runtime, or (d) knowledge/inference of application
dependence on the different network/service devices. Each of these requirements
raises the barrier of adoption, as compared to NetPoirot /Vigil.
Everflow [145] represents a different class of these algorithms that aims at ac-
curately identifying the path of packets of interest. However, Everflow does not
scale to be used as an always on diagnosis system. Furthermore, it uses the DSCP
bit which is typically reserved for other purposes.
Some inference approaches aim at covering the full topology, e.g. [65]. While
useful in their own right, they typically only provides a sampled view of con-
nection livelihood (this is also true of most tomography approaches) and do not
achieve the type of always on monitoring that NetPoirot and Vigil provide. The
time between probes for [65] for example is currently 5 minutes. Therefore, it is
highly likely that failures that happen at finer time scales slip through the cracks
of its monitoring probes.
Other such work, e.g. [88, 119, 87, 84] require access to both endpoints and/or
switches. Such access may not always be possible.
Fault Localization by Consensus [108] violates the data locality requirement, but
does not require any information from the network or service. The work assumes
that a failure on a node common to the path used by a subset of clients will re-
sult in failures on all or a significant number of those clients. Therefore, if many
clients in different locations report a failure, it is most likely caused by the service,
whereas if only a single client fails the problem is likely local to that client. Figure
6.1 illustrates why this approach fails in the face of problems such as EX. Here, we
use the Network Emulator Tool (NEWT) [94] to induce a 5% packet drop rate on
all TCP connections to the remote service on a single machine in our stage cluster.
Even though the 5% drop rate was present over the entire 6 hour period, only 3 EXs
occurred. These events happened when data transmissions increased. This shows
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that even though a failure may be present in the network, not all clients will ob-
serve it at the same time or in the same way. NetProfiler [108] would erroneously,
classify such a problem as a client side problem. These approaches require further
information in order to provide reliable fault localization. Vigil builds on this idea,
it provides a confidence measure that identifies how reliable a diagnosis report is.
Figure 6.1: Each dot shows BPostedmax in time and is representative of a 30s
epoch.
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Fault Localization using TCP statistics [90, 134, 140, 138, 119] targets using TCP
metrics for diagnosis. [90] requires heavyweight active probing. [134] uses learn-
ing techniques (SVM), however, it relies on packet captures from both end points
and is limited in the scope of failures it detects (network and application problems
only). T-Rat [140] infers TCP information from packet captures. It is used to un-
derstand why a TCP connection is rate limited. Our diagnosis goals are broader.
T-Rat is too heavyweight to be used as always on. SNAP [138] requires sensitive
information, such as topology, path information, and switch counters to perform
diagnosis. NetPoirot eliminates the need to share such information with clients.
SNAP [138] initially identifies performance problems/causes for single connec-
tions by acquiring TCP information which are gathered by querying socket op-
tions. It also gathers routing data combined with topology data to compare the
TCP statistics for connections that share the same host, link or top of rank switch
or aggregator switch. It then collects the mapping of connections to applications to
further see if a particular application is experiencing more problems than others.
Given their lack of continuous monitoring, all of these approaches fail in detect-
ing the type of problems NetPoirot/Vigil are designed to detect. Furthermore, the
goal of Vigil is more ambitious, namely to find the link that causes packet drops
for each TCP connection.
Network tomography [143, 71, 85, 51, 80, 76, 103, 38, 144, 72, 52, 99] typically con-
sist of two aspects: (i) the gathering and filtering of network traffic data to be
used for identifying the points of failure [103, 143] and (ii) using the information
found in the previous step to identify where/why failures occurred [71, 85, 51, 99,
48, 52, 20]. Vigil and NetPoirot utilize ongoing traffic to detect problems, unlike
tomography-based approaches which require a much heavier-weight operation of
gathering large volumes of data for analysis. Tomography-based approaches are
also better suited for non-transient failures, while our systems can handle both
transient and persistent errors. NetPoirot/Vigil also have coverage that extends
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to the entire network infrastructure, and does not limit coverage to only paths
between designated monitors as some tomography approaches do. Some tomog-
raphy techniques on analyzing failures [143, 51, 103, 99] are complementary and
can be applied to NetPoirot/Vigil to improve our accuracy.
Learning Based Approaches [36, 49, 6] do failure detection. NetPoirot also uses
machine learning techniques, but the application domain is different (home net-
works [6] and mobile video delivery [49]). [36] uses decision trees in order to
locate the device responsible for a failure by observing the path traversed on the
tree. It requires request to server mappings. NetPoirot does not require this addi-
tional information.
Application diagnosis [39, 7] aim at identifying the cause of problems in a dis-
tributed application’s execution path. These works are useful in their own right,
but the limitations of diagnosing network level paths and the complexities associ-
ated with this task are different. Obtaining all execution paths seen by an applica-
tion, is plausible in such systems but is not an option in ours.
Fault localization in wide area networks [139, 102, 128, 127, 89, 21] shares some
similarity to that of Vigil, the constraints in a datacenter network are vastly differ-
ent.
Understanding datacenter failures [146, 62] aims to identify the various types of
failures in data center networks. These approaches are useful in understanding the
types of problems that arise in practice and to ensure that our monitoring/diagno-
sis engines are well equipped to find them. In fact, in our analysis of Vigil, we use
the findings of [146].
Perhaps the most related body of work to Vigil is that of [119] which requires
modifications to routers and assumes a specific topology, limitations that Vigil
does not have. Moreover, in order to apply their approach to a traditional data-
center, a number of engineering problems need to be overcome as well, including
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finding a substitute for their use of the DSCP (used for other purposes in our data
center).
6.2 Multi Server Video Delivery
There has obviously been much work on optimizing video transmission and us-
ing multipaths to overcome network impairments. Our intent is not to provide
an exhaustive review, but rather to summarize major approaches and highlight
similarities and differences with this work.
6.2.1 Video Delivery Optimizations
Adaptive bit rate (ABR) [56, 34] is, as mentioned earlier, a powerful approach for
mitigating the impact of network rate variations by allowing clients to correspond-
ingly adjust their video coding rate. The main drawback of ABR is that it requires
servers and caches to store multiple encodings of the same video, or codecs to be
able to dynamically update their coding rate. In addition, adjustments in coding
rates still produce noticeable changes in video quality [125, 59, 122]. Our goal with
Sunstar is complementary to ABR, in that we aim to leverage multiple paths to
different servers to minimize (network) rate variations, and therefore coding rate
changes.
Caching is another popular strategy. It improves performance by moving files as
close as possible to clients through caches located at the network edge. This is,
however, not always effective, in part because copyrights laws make much con-
tent un-cachable, and the combination of the long tail of video popularity [41] and
the use of ABR can lower cache efficiency. Consequently, even smart caching algo-
rithms only boast a cache efficiency of about 50% [114] (for ABR videos). Sunstar
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is meant to improve video delivery in instances when video cannot be served from
a local edge cache.
OpenConnect [101] was proposed by Netflix. It relies on embedding appliances
in ISPs’ networks to locate content closer to clients and to preemptively populate
caches at off-peak hours to avoid cache warm-up and network congestion during
peak hours. It calls for partnership between content providers and ISPs, e.g. locat-
ing appliances in the ISP’s facility, which some large ISPs are reluctant to engage
in as they have competitive businesses [120].
Content filtering limits content available to users to content that can be delivered
with high quality, e.g. from caches. This is realized by applying filters that limit
viewable listings to a subset of (popular) videos, or by steering users away from
unpopular items [25]. Both approaches result in potential loss of revenue, e.g.
removing such filters can increase the number of views by 45% [25].
Dynamic CDN switching is offered by companies such as Conviva and Cedexis
which act as brokers in the CDN domain. They measure CDN status and switch
between CDN providers based on performance. The main disadvantage is that
CDNs no longer control how clients are redirected to servers, which can have un-
intended consequences, including higher costs [97]. In contrast, Sunstar keeps the
assignment of clients to servers under the video provider’s purview and incorpo-
rates mitigating cost increase as an explicit criterion.
Hybrid CDN-P2P seeks to combine the best of CDN and peer-to-peer solutions [137].
Netsession [142] offers a representative example of the potential benefits of such
an approach. Unlike Sunstar, it again does not offer an explicit control on how
improving performance affects a provider’s cost. Additionally, aspects such as
copyright management are traditionally difficult to handle in a P2P setting.
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6.2.2 Multipath Solutions
The benefits of multipaths have been studied in numerous settings, e.g.[9, 124, 45],
but perhaps most visible among them are studies of Multipath TCP (MPTCP) [116],
whose investigations related to congestion control [123, 135, 112, 14] or schedul-
ing [13, 106] are of most relevance, even if not directly applicable because of MPTCP’s
assumption of a single source and a single destination. Nevertheless, several tech-
niques developed to improve MPTCP can be repurposed in a MuMS setting. For
example, as discussed in Section 5.3, Sunstar is able to leverage MPTCP’s oppor-
tunistic retransmit to improve its performance.
More directly comparable to Sunstar are works that explicitly target improving
video delivery by relying on multiple servers. In most such settings, e.g.[118, 40],
the focus has, however, been on optimizing download rates, which, as we shall see,
can have a significant impact on cost. Specifically and as discussed in Section 5.2,
while the more aggressive download strategies of [118, 40] can reduce the odds of
skips and stalls, they typically result in higher costs. In contrast, Sunstar aims to
realize comparable improvements in video quality, but with little to no increases
in cost.
6.2.3 Server selection and cost optimizations
Another relevant body of work is that of server selection algorithms that optimize
for a given metric, e.g. performance or cost [98, 133, 100, 23]. Extending those
approaches to a MuMS’ setting is, however, challenging. This is because the mul-
tipath nature of MuMS clients makes predicting variations in traffic volumes at
peering links more difficult than with single path clients. In particular, clients are
now free to choose how to distribute video requests across paths. How this im-
pacts cost and performance adds a new non-trivial dimension to the problem.
In this context, the approach closest to Sunstar is [86]. It considers both perfor-
131
6.2. Multi Server Video Delivery
mance and cost and adopts a cost minimization formulation with performance as
a constraint, where for each CDN performance is based on long-term QoE mea-
surements from clients in different regions. Given an expected request load, [86]
computes a “prioritized” list of servers that a client should use when requesting
content. Higher priority servers are to be used first as long as they have available
capacity. A TCP-like AIMD mechanism is used to estimate the bandwidth avail-
able to each server. Sunstar’s approach differs from that of [86] in that rather than
minimizing cost and keeping performance as a constraint, it leverages its under-
standing of the relationship between cost and performance to select rate variation
as its minimization target. In addition, Sunstar’s scheduler offers a more respon-
sive mechanism than that of [86], which is limited to the set of servers computed
by its optimization. In some sense, the scheduler of [86] is similar to the min-RTT
scheduler of Section 5.4, which, as we shall see, performs significantly worse that
that of Sunstar in terms of both cost and performance.
Finally, of note in the context of cost optimization is [126], which attempts to
account for the contributions of individual users to a 95th percentile cost function.
Although such an approach could be used to formulate an appropriate objective
function for a server selection algorithm, it requires detailed knowledge of the
exact traffic patterns of each user. This is unlikely to be feasible, especially in a
multipath setting where variations on a given path affect traffic on all paths.
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Conclusion
Endpoints can play a significant role in improving their own quality of service
when using networks such as the Internet or datacenters. In this work we demon-
strate how clients can effectively assist network operators in finding the source of
performance problems. We introduce two systems NetPoirot and Vigil that allow
the client to help with diagnosis (and recovery) when failures occur.
Diagnosis and recovery are only one part of ensuring all clients achieve high
QoS. Both take time to resolve performance problems if/when they occur. We
show that through the use of multiple path (or multiple servers in the context of
video delivery) clients can significantly improve their performance as all such path
are unlikely to experience problems at the same time. We demonstrate the effec-
tiveness of this idea in the context of video delivery through a new multipath-
multiserver client (Sunstar).
There are a number of questions that remain unanswered in this work. For
example, in designing NetPoirot we found that TCP reacts differently to different
types of failures depending on their root cause. By deriving a better understanding
of when, how, and why such reactions are triggered it should be possible to arrive
at not only a more robust protocol but also to provide further assistance to oper-
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ators when diagnosing failures in data center networks. Furthermore, the use of
multipath changes the diagnosis problem significantly. How does one identify the
subpath responsible for a failure? What is the implication for congestion control
and scheduling across the different path? How fast can these algorithms recover
from a transient failure and reroute traffic accordingly? What are the potential im-
plications of these protocols for network security? These are problems that remain
unanswered and should be investigated if these protocols are to be widely adopted
in future.
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Vigil Proofs
Definition: [Clos topology]
A Clos topology has npod pods each with n0 top of the rack (ToR) switches under
which lie H hosts. The ToR switches are connected to n1 tier-1 switches by a com-
plete network (n0n1 links). Links between tier-0 and tier-1 switches are referred
to as level 1 links. The tier-1 switches within each pod are connected to n2 tier-2
switches by another complete network (n1n2 links). Links between these switches
are called level 2 links.
Remark 4 (Communication and failure model). Assume that connection occur uni-
formly at random between hosts under different ToR switches. Since the number of hosts
under each ToR switch is the same, this is equivalent to saying that connections occur
uniformly at random directly between ToR switches. Also, assume that link failure and
connection routing are independent and that links drop packets independently across links
and across packets.
Remark 5 (Notation). We use calligraphic letter (A) to denote sets. Also, we write [M ]
to mean the set of integers between 1 and M , i.e., [M ] = 1, . . . ,M .
Theorem 6. In a data center with Clos topology, the rate of traceroutes T going through
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any link is bounded by
T ≤ CH
n1n2
·max
[
n2,
n20(npod − 1)
(n0npod − 1)
]
, (A.1)
where C is the connection rate between hosts. Hence, a maximum traceroute rate of Tmax
will be met if the connection rate of each host satisfies
C ≤ n1n2Tmax
H ·max
[
n2,
n20(npod−1)
(n0npod−1)
] . (A.2)
Proof. Start by noticing that the number of hosts below each ToR switch is the
same, so that we can consider connections to happen uniformly at random directly
between ToR switches at a rate CH . Moreover, note that routing probabilities are
the same for links on the same level, so that the traceroute rate depends only on
whether the link is on level 1 or level 2.
Since the probability of a switch routing a connection through any link is uni-
form, the traceroute rate of a level 1 link is given by
R1(r) =
1
n1
CHr, (A.3)
where r denotes the probability of issuing a traceroute, i.e., the probability of a
TCP retransmission occurring during a connection. Similarly for a level 2 link:
R2(r) =
n0
n1n2
n0(npod − 1)
(n0npod − 1)CHr, (A.4)
where the second fraction represents the probability of a host connecting to an-
other host outside its own pod, i.e., of going through a level 2 link. Since (A.3)
and (A.4) are increasing in r and r ≤ 1, it holds that T ≤ max [R1(1), R2(1)]. Taking
max [R1(1), R2(1)] ≤ Tmax yields (A.2).
Theorem 7. In a Clos topology with n0 ≥ n2 and npod ≥ 1 + max
[
n0
n1
, n2(n0−1)
n0(n0−n2) , 1
]
,
Vigil will rank with probability (1 − ) the k < n2(n0npod−1)
n0(npod−1) bad links that drop packets
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with probability pb above all good links that drop packets with probability pg as long as
pg ≤ 1− (1− pb)
cl
αcu
, (A.5)
where cl and cu are lower and upper bounds, respectively, on the number of packets per
connection,
α =
n0(4n0 − k)(npod − 1)
n2(n0npod − 1)− n0(npod − 1)k , (A.6)
and
 ≤ e−N DKL((1+δ)vg‖vg) + e−N DKL((1−δ)vb‖vb)
= 2e−O(N),
(A.7)
with vg and vb being the probabilities of a good and bad link receiving a bad vote, respec-
tively, N being the total number of connections between hosts, and DKL(q‖r) denoting
the Kullback-Leibler divergence between two Bernoulli distributions with probabilities of
success q and r.
Before proceeding, note that when, as in our data center, n0 ≥ 2n2, n2(n0−1)n0(n0−n2) ≤ 1,
so that case the condition on the number of pods reduces to npod ≥ 1 + n0n1 .
Proof. The proof proceeds as follows. First, note that the number of votes on a
bad (good) link is a binomial random variable with parametersN and vb (vg). Then,
using large deviation theory [11], we proceed to show that if vb ≥ vg, Vigil will rank
bad links above good links with high probability for large enough N (Lemma 8).
Finally, we derive bounds on vb and vg using Boole’s inequality (Lemma 9) and use
these results to show that vb ≥ vg if pb and pg satisfy (A.5).
Let us start by stating the lemmas and showing how they imply Theorem 7.
Lemma 8. If vb ≥ vg, Vigil will rank bad links above good links with probability (1 − )
for  as in (A.7).
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Lemma 9. In a Clos topology with n0 ≥ n2 and npod ≥ max
[
n0
n1
, n2(n0−1)
n0(n0−n2) , 1
]
+ 1, it
holds that for k ≤ n0 bad links
vb ≥ rb
n0n1npod
(A.8a)
vg ≤ 1
n1n2npod
n0(npod − 1)
n0npod − 1
[
(4− k
n0
)rg +
k
n0
rb
]
(A.8b)
where rb and rg are the probabilities of a retransmission occurring due to a bad and a good
link, respectively.
From the (A.8) in Lemma 9, it holds that
rb ≥
n0(4n0 − k)(npod − 1)
n2(n0npod − 1)− n0(npod − 1)k︸ ︷︷ ︸
α
rg ⇒ vb ≥ vg, (A.9)
for k < n2(n0npod−1)
n0(npod−1) < n0. Thus, in a Clos topology, rb ≥ αrg ⇒ vb ≥ vg for α as
in (A.6).
However, (A.9) gives a relation between the probabilities of retransmission (rg, rb)
instead of the packet drop rates (pg, pb) as in (A.5). Indeed, to obtain (A.5), note that
the probability r of retransmission during a connection with c packets due to a link
that drops packets with probability p is r = 1 − (1 − p)c. Since r is monotonically
increasing in c, we have that rb ≥ 1− (1− pb)cl . Similarly, rg ≤ 1− (1− pg)cu . Using
the fact (1− x)n ≥ 1− nx yields (A.5).
We now proceed with the proofs of Lemmas 8 and 9.
Proof of Lemma 8. We start by noting that in a data center-sized Clos network, al-
most every connection has a hop count of 5. In our data center, this happens
to 97.5% of connections. Therefore, we can approximate links votes by assum-
ing all bad votes have the same value. Thus, suffices to determine how many bad
votes each link has.
Since links cause retransmissions independently across connections (see Re-
mark 4), the number of bad votes received by a bad link is a binomial random
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variable B with parameters N , the total number of connections, and vb, the proba-
bility of a bad link receiving a bad vote. Similarly, letG be the number of bad votes
on a good link, a binomial random variable with parameters N and vg. Vigil will
correctly rank the bad links if B ≥ G, i.e., when bad links receive more votes than
good links. This event contains the event {G ≤ (1 + δ)Nvg ∩ B ≥ (1 − δ)Nvb} for
δ ≤ vb−vg
vb+vg
. Using the union bound P [
⋃
iEi] ≤
∑
i P [Ei] [53], the probability of Vigil
identifying the correct links is therefore bounded by
P(B ≥ G) ≥ P [G ≤ (1 + δ)Nvg ∩B ≥ (1− δ)Nvb]
≥ 1− P [G ≥ (1 + δ)Nvg]
− P [B ≤ (1− δ)Nvb]
(A.10)
To proceed, note that the probabilities in (A.10) can be bounded using the large
deviation principle [11]. Indeed, let S be a binomial random variable with param-
eters M and q. For δ > 0 it holds that
P [S ≥ (1 + δ)qM ] ≤ e−M DKL((1+δ)q‖q) (A.11a)
P [S ≤ (1− δ)qM ] ≤ e−M DKL((1−δ)q‖q) (A.11b)
where DKL(q‖r) is the Kullback-Leibler divergence between two Bernoulli distri-
butions with probabilities of success q and r [?]. Explicitly,
DKL(q‖r) = q log
(q
r
)
+ (1− q) log
(
1− q
1− r
)
.
Substituting the inequalities (A.11) into (A.10) yields (A.7).
Proof of Lemma 9. Before proceeding, let T0, T1, and T2 denote the set of ToR, tier-
1, and tier-2 switches respectively (Figure A.1). Also let T s0 and T s1 , s = [npod],
denote the tier-0 and tier-1 switches in pod s respectively. Note that T0 = T 10 ∪· · ·∪
T npod0 and T1 = T 11 ∪ · · · ∪ T npod1 . Note that we use subscripts to denote the switch
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Level 1 links
Level 2 links
Figure A.1: Illustration of notation for Clos topology used in the proof of Lemma 9
tier and superscripts to denote its pod. To clarify the derivations, we maintain
this notation for indices. For instance, is0 is the i-th tier-0 switch from pod s, i.e.,
is0 ∈ T s0 , and `2 is the `-th tier-2 switch. Note that tier-2 switches do not belong to
specific pods. We write (is0, js1) to denote the level 1 link that connects is0 to js1 (as
in Figure A.1) and use r(is0, js1) = r(js1, is0) to refer to the probability of link (is0, js1)
causing a retransmission. Note that r is also a function of the number of packets in
a connection, but we omit this dependence for clarity.
The bounds in (A.8) are obtained by decomposing the events that Vigil votes
“bad” for a level 1 or level 2 link into a union of simpler events. Before proceeding,
note that each connection only goes through one link in each level and in each
direction, so that events such as “going through a ToR to tier-1 link” are disjoint.
Starting with level 1, letA0 be the event that a connection goes through link (is0, js1).
This event happens with probability
P [A0] =
1
n0n1npod
, (A.12a)
given that there are n0n1npod level 1 links and that connections occur uniformly at
random. Therefore, a link (is0, js1) receives a bad vote if a connection goes through
it (event A0) and either of the following occurs:
• event A1: (is0, js1) causes a retransmission, i.e.,
P [A1] = r(is0, js1) (A.12b)
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• event A2: the connection also goes through some (js1, ks0), ks0 6= is0, and (js1, ks0)
causes a retransmission. Therefore,
P [A2] =
1
n0npod − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
connect to ks0
∑
ks0∈T s0 \{is0}
r(js1, k
s
0) (A.12c)
• event A3: the connection also goes through some (js1, `2) and (js1, `2) causes a
retransmission, which occurs with probability
P [A3] =
n0(npod − 1)
n0npod − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
leave pod s
1
n2︸︷︷︸
go through
`2
∑
`2∈T2
r(js1, `2) (A.12d)
• event A4: the connection also goes through some (`2,mt1), t 6= s, and (`2,mt1)
causes a retransmission, so that
P [A4] =
n0
n0npod − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
go to pod t
1
n1n2︸ ︷︷ ︸
go through
(`2,mt1)
∑
`2∈T2,
mt1∈T t1 ,
t∈[npod]\s
r(`2,m
t
1) (A.12e)
• eventA5: the connection also goes through some (mt1, ut0), t 6= s, and (mt1, ut0)
causes a retransmission. Thus,
P [A5] =
1
n0npod − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
go to pod t
1
n1︸︷︷︸
go through
mt1
∑
mt1∈T t1 ,
ut0∈T t0 ,
t∈[npod]\s
r(mt1, u
t
0) (A.12f)
Similarly for level 2, letB0 be the event that a connection goes through link (js1, `2),
so that its probability is
P [B0] =
1
npod︸︷︷︸
start in pod s
n0(npod − 1)
n0npod − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
leave pod s
1
n1n2︸ ︷︷ ︸
go through
(js1 ,`2)
(A.13a)
Then, link (js1, `2) gets a bad vote if a connection goes through (js1, `2) (event B0)
and either of the following occurs:
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• event B1: (js1, `2) causes a retransmission, i.e.,
P [B1] = r(js1, `2) (A.13b)
• event B2: the connection also goes through some (is0, js1) and (is0, js1) causes a
retransmission. Then,
P [B2] =
1
n0︸︷︷︸
start in is0
∑
is0∈T s0
r(is0, j
s
1) (A.13c)
• event B3: the connection also goes through some (`2,mt1), t 6= s, and (`2,mt1)
causes a retransmission, which yields
P [B3] =
1
n1(npod − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
go through mt1
∑
mt1∈T t1 ,
t∈[npod]\s
r(`2,m
t
1) (A.13d)
• eventB4: the connection also goes through some (mt1, ut0), t 6= s, and (mt1, ut0)
causes a retransmission. Therefore,
P [B4] =
1
n0n1(npod − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
go through
(mt1,n
t
0), t 6=s
∑
mt1∈T t1 ,
ut0∈T t0 ,
t∈[npod]\s
r(mt1, u
t
0) (A.13e)
To obtain the lower bound in (A.8a), note that a bad link receives at least as
many bad votes as retransmissions it causes. Therefore, the probability of Vigil
voting “bad” for a bad link is larger than the probability of that link causing a
retransmission. Explicitly, using the fact that failure and routing are independent
and r = rb, (A.12) and (A.13) give
sb ≥ min [P(A0 ∩A1),P(B0 ∩B1)]
= min
[
1
n0n1npod
,
1
n1n2npod
n0(npod − 1)
n0npod − 1
]
rb.
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The assumption that npod ≥ 1 + n2(n0−1)n0(n0−n2) makes the first term smaller than the
second and yields (A.8a).
In contrast, the upper bound in (A.8b) is obtained by applying the union bound [53]
to (A.12) and (A.13). Indeed, this leads to the following inequalities for the proba-
bility of Vigil voting “bad” for a good level 1 and level 2 link:
vg,1 = P [A0 ∩ (A1 ∪A2 ∪A3 ∪A4 ∪A5)]
≤ P[A0]
(
5∑
i=1
P[Ai]
)
(A.14a)
vg,2 = P [B0 ∩ (B1 ∪B2 ∪B3 ∪B4)]
≤ P[B0]
(
4∑
i=1
P[Bi]
)
(A.14b)
where vg,1 and vg,2 denote the probability of a good level 1 and level 2 link being
voted bad, respectively. Note that once again used the independence between fail-
ures and routing. From (A.14), it is straightforward to see that vg ≤ max [vg,1, vg,2].
To obtain (A.8b), we first bound (A.14) by assuming that all k bad links belong
to the event Ai and Bi, i ≥ 2, that maximize vg,1 and vg,2. For a good level 1 link,
it is straightforward to see from (A.12) that since n0 ≥ n2, event A3 has the largest
coefficient. Thus, taking all links to be good except for k bad links satisfying A3
one has
vg,1 ≤ 1
n0n1npod
n0(npod − 1)
n0npod − 1 × [(
4− k
n2
+
2(n0 − 1)
n0(npod − 1)
)
rg +
k
n2
rb
]
, (A.15)
which holds for k ≤ n2. Similarly for a good level 2 link, since npod ≥ n0n1 + 1 it
holds from (A.13) that event B2 has the largest coefficient. Therefore,
vg,2 ≤ 1
n1n2npod
n0(npod − 1)
n0npod − 1 × [(
4− k
n0
)
rg +
k
n0
rb
]
, (A.16)
143
Appendix A. Vigil Proofs
which holds for k ≤ n0. Straightforward algebra shows that for npod ≥ 2, vg,2 ≥ vg,1,
from which (A.8a) yields.
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Video Delivery And QoS
B.1 Mechanical Turk Experiment
The motivation was to further validate the QoE metrics (stalls and skips) we se-
lected to evaluate video quality. For that purpose, we used a high quality (HD)
documentary about Buckingham Palace1. The video was divided into equal sized
segments of 1 min each, and different types of impairments were introduced in
those segments. Due to of logistics constraints, only results for stalls are available.
Specifically, we considered: 1) a single stall of variable duration at a random loca-
tion in the video; 2) multiple stalls of small (≈ 0.5 sec), medium (≈ 1 sec), and long
(≈ 1.5 sec) durations, evenly distributed in the segment; 3) multiple stalls with the
same distribution in duration, but now closely spaced (0.1 sec) in a burst. In 2) and
3) we varied the number of stalls. The quality of the video segments was evaluated
on a 0−5 scale (0 being the lowest quality) by 20 users recruited through Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk market. For calibration purposes, users were first presented with
an unimpaired video segment, and told to assign it a rating of 5.
Results of the study are presented in Figure ??, which confirms a strong cor-
1https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jffKwoWjXtg.
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relation (error bars again correspond to 95 percent confidence intervals) between
stalls, both number and duration, and video quality. The limited size of the study
is clearly insufficient for broad conclusions, but it further confirms previous QoE
studies [18, 69, 50] and the impact of stalls on video quality. Hence, fewer/shorter
stalls do translate into higher video quality.
B.2 Server Selection Algorithm
Server selection can be viewed as a Stackelberg game between the clients and the
provider, with the provider as the leader and clients as the followers. Once as-
signed servers, clients seek to maximize their performance by scheduling requests
to servers accordingly. Given this behavior, the provider’s goal is to assign servers
so as to minimize the 95th percentile cost. This non-convex cost function together
with the online nature of the game make computing the optimal assignment strat-
egy hard.
We therefore propose a semi-online greedy optimization that is run every 5 mins
and uses the current estimate of the 95th percentile cost to assign client’s to servers
in a way that meets their rate guarantees while minimizing cost. Specifically, the
optimization maintains an estimate of the number of client’s expected to arrive
from each region (clients in a region have similar bandwidth profiles and share
the same connections to servers). Given these estimates, it seeks to identify which
assignment of servers for each group of client results in the smallest increase in
the current 95th percentile cost. Furthermore, while the optimization’s goal is to
minimize peering costs, it acknowledges that this should not be at the expense of
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poor performance for the clients. Thus, it also includes two additional constraints:
E
[∑
j
αijRij − T
]
≥ 0 (B.1)
E
(∑
j
αijRij − T
)2 ≤ γ (B.2)
where αij is the number of requests client i sends to server j and Rij is the rate in
chunks per second from that client’s region to server j.
Note that, reusing the notation of Section ??, B.2 can be written as aiTQai +
bTai + c ≤ γ where Q is a matrix with Qii = V ar(Ri) + R̂2i and Qij = R̂iR̂j , b is a
vector where bi = −2TR̂i, and c = T 2.
Take Fj as the current 95th percentile cost on peering link j, Lj the current load
on peering link j, and mi the expected number of clients arriving from region i in
the current decision period. We aim to solve the following optimization:
min
αij
max
Bj
(Bj + Lj −Fj, 0)
s.t. Bj =
∑
i
mi
∑
j
αijR̂ij
∑
j
αijR̂ij ≥ Ti ∀i
αij ≤ wmax
αTi Qiαi + b
Tαi + T
2 ≤ γ2
Bj + Lj ≤ Cj
where wmax is the maximum window size allowed on the clients, and the server
selection algorithm assigns all servers with αij > 0 to region i. It is straightfor-
ward to show that Q in the above equations is positive semidefinite. Therefore, the
optimization is convex and can be solved efficiently.
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